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A key focus of much scholarly attention is on the (theoretical) relationship between 
legal orders. The practical question I intend to answer in this article is the following: 
how can we know who has the final say – international, European Union (EU) or 
national law? I proceed in three steps. First, I critically sketch major current theories 
– monism and dualism, as well as global legal pluralism and global constitutionalism. 
However, because none of them offers a satisfactory answer to the question posed, I 
move to the reconceptualization stage of the theoretical relationship between legal 
orders. In the second step, I offer my account of how to think about the relationship 
between legal orders by introducing the theory of the law creators' circle (TLCC). The 
TLCC provides a theoretical foundation for deciding on the source of the decisive 
norm. It does not, however, provide a general solution which fits any norm conflict 
stemming from overlapping legal orders. Thus, the purpose of this article is to develop 
a legal theory which facilitates the understanding of the interaction between 
international law, EU and national law. Third, I use a doctrinal analysis to show the 
results of the TLCC application. For instance, in the famous Kadi saga, according to 
the TLCC, the EU should have either claimed that the UN Security Council was 
acting ultra vires or considered the UN Security Council Resolution faulty because 
UN human rights (instead of EU human rights) had been violated. 
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All truly wise thoughts have been thought already. 
All one has to do is try to think them again.1 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between international and national law has been debated for 
centuries. Generally, the floor has been divided between two approaches – 
dualism and monism. I argue that, in the light of major developments since 
                                                 
1 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre - Buch 2 oder die 
Entsagenden (Zenodot 2016, originally 1829 2nd ed.) 239 (English translation by the 
author). 
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their inception, like the establishment of the European Union (EU), these 
theories can no longer comprehensively explain the relationship between 
international, EU and national law.2 A key focus of my work is to re-
conceptualize the theoretical relationship between legal orders.3 Even 
though some scholars have doubted the relevance of theoretical inquiries 
such as a dualistic or a monistic analysis of the relationship between legal 
orders, I cannot agree with those who trivialize this theoretical discussion by 
saying it would be 'unreal, artificial and strictly beside the point'.4 If we 
continue reading Fitzmaurice's view, it becomes clear that this is simply a 
dualistic argument. This is because he continued arguing that '[i]n the same 
way it would be idle to start a controversy about whether the English legal 
system was superior to or supreme over the French or vice-versa, because 
these systems do not pretend to have the same field of application'.5 This is 
also an implicit theoretical approach, which is in Fitzmaurice’s case a 
dualistic standpoint.6 Yet, current developments, fundamental changes and 
new phenomena such as the massive increase in international institutions, 
actors, norms and tribunals as well as adjudicators make it imperative to seek 
new theoretical concepts. The so-called 'globalization of law'7 as framed in 
                                                 
2 Lando Kirchmair, 'The 'Janus Face' of the Court of Justice of the European Union: 
A theoretical appraisal of the EU legal order's relationship with international and 
member state law' (2012) 4(3) Göttingen Journal of International Law 677-691. 
3 See, for example, Lando Kirchmair, 'The Theory of the Law Creators' Circle: Re-
Conceptualizing the Monism – Dualism – Pluralism Debate' (2016) 17 (2) German 
Law Journal 179-214. 
4 Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, 'The General Principles of International Law Considered 
from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law' (1957) 92 Recueil des Cours de l'Acadeḿie 
de Droit Int'l. 1 (71).   
5 Ibid 71-72. 
6 For a practical approach concerning the relationship between international and 
national law, see, for instance, Helen Keller, Rezeption des Völkerrechts (Springer 2003) 
6. This practical approach, however, has been criticized by Stefan Griller, 
'Völkerrecht und Landesrecht' in Robert Walter et al. (eds), Hans Kelsen und das 
Völkerrecht – Ergebnisse eines Internationalen Symposiums in Wien (Manz 2005) 84, n. 3. 
7 In relation to this designation, see Jean-Bernard Auby, 'Globalisation et droit public' 
in Gouverner, administrer, juger. Mélanges en l'honneur de Jean Waline (Dalloz 2002) 135; 
Anne Peters, 'The Globalization of State Constitutions' in Janne Nijman and Andre 
Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide between National and International 
Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 251; see also David J. Bederman, Globalization 
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the famous Constitutionalization of International Law,8 may be mentioned, 
among other developments, to elucidate the ever-growing importance of the 
debate on the final say between international, EU and national law. 
I start from the assumption that it is essential to have a theoretical concept 
for the relationship between legal orders, because I hold, that we cannot 
intelligibly discuss this relationship without a theoretical concept. Without 
a theoretical concept, underlying assumptions often remain implicit and are 
not addressed clearly.9 My work is based on the conviction that a common 
(normative) denominator of international, EU and national law is 
fundamentally necessary to solve norm conflicts between overlapping legal 
orders.10 Without such a common (normative) denominator we are left with 
non-normative or unilateral solutions for norm conflicts between 
overlapping legal orders. I wish to offer new theoretical insights because I 
hold that the current approaches do not provide satisfactory accounts. After 
critically reviewing the current dominant theories (dualism, monism, 
pluralism and constitutionalism) in the first step (section II.), I depart from 
Goethe by providing my own theoretical account. 
The practical question I intend to answer is the following: how can we know 
who has the final say – International, EU or national law?  The way I try to 
respond to this question does not follow monism or dualism, nor pluralism or 
                                                 
and International Law (Palgrave 2008). Neil Walker, Intimations of global law 
(Cambridge University Press 2014). 
8 Alfred Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (Springer 1926); Jan 
Klabbers, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press 
2009); Oliver Diggelmann and Tilmann Altwicker, 'Is there something like a 
constitution of international law? A critical analysis of the debate on world 
constitutionalism' (2008) 68 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 623-50.  
9 Compare in this regard also András Jakab, European Constitutional Language 
(Cambridge University Press 2016) 1 quoting John Maynard Keynes, The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Palgrave Macmillan 1936) 383 
concerning economics: 'The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both 
when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe 
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves 
of some defunct economist'. 
10 Lando Kirchmair, 'The Theory of the Law Creators' Circle: Re-Conceptualizing the 
Monism – Dualism – Pluralism Debate' (2016) 17 (2) German Law Journal 179-214. 
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constitutionalism.11 I intend to answer this question by introducing the 
theoretical concept of the law creators' circle (TLCC) (section III.).12 In 
short, TLCC aims at re-conceptualizing the monism-dualism-pluralism-
constitutionalism debate. The aim is to establish whether it is up to national 
law to determine the effect and validity of international or EU law within the 
domestic (constitutional) legal order. In more general terms, I wish to 
provide a theoretical concept to answer the question as to how we can know 
who has the final say. It does not provide a general solution which fits any 
norm conflict stemming from overlapping legal orders. The purpose of this 
article is to develop a legal theory which facilitates understanding of the 
interaction between international law, EU and national law. TLCC shares its 
point of departure with most social contract theories. It is based on a 
hypothetical state imagined as a legal vacuum, denoted the 'legal desert'. 
However, in contrast to political philosophy, the hypothesis behind the law 
creators' circle aims solely to elucidate the structural relationship between 
legal orders, without saying anything about how legal orders in particular or 
society in general should be organized. The theory is thus based on an 
abstract definition of law (i.e. the necessary common (normative) 
denominator) as the binding consensus between natural persons. 
On the basis of this theoretical ground, I wish to engage with practice 
(section IV.) – I apply TLCC to the relationship between international, EU 
and national law.13 I present a doctrinal analysis of relevant provisions at EU 
level on the basis of the TLCC. I am convinced that a theory-based argument 
on the relationship of EU and Member State (MS) law will fruitfully 
contribute to the key questions of EU law, such as the doctrine of direct 
applicability or the primacy question between EU law and fundamental 
constitutional law of the MS. It could provide for a convincing theoretical 
                                                 
11 If you agree with me that current theories cannot offer a convincing account for 
norm conflict solution regarding the relationship between international, EU and 
national law you can skip the critique of current theories (II.) and proceed directly 
to III., TLCC. 
12 Lando Kirchmair, Die Theorie des Rechtserzeugerkreises – eine rechtstheoretische 
Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Völkerrecht zu Staatsrecht am Beispiel der 
österreichischen Rechtsordnung (Duncker & Humblot 2013). 
13 Kirchmair (n 10) for an extensive account thereof applied to the relationship of 
public international law and the Austrian legal order. 
52 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
argumentation, solving potential tensions between the constitutional courts 
of MS and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). For instance, arguments 
embedded in a sound theoretical explanation may help to clarify a potential 
stress ratio of European integration and the (German) 'constitutional 
identity' which, according to the German Constitutional Court, is resistant 
to integration.14 
II. CURRENT THEORIES AND DOCTRINES AND THEIR FLAWS 
1. Dualism & Monism 
The relationship between international and national law is a topic of great 
importance. Generally, the floor has been divided between dualism, as 
developed by Heinrich Triepel, and monism, mainly formulated by Hans 
Kelsen, both of which need to be reviewed critically from today's perspective. 
I argue that these theories can no longer comprehensively explain the 
relationship between international and EU or EU and national law.15 And that 
due to their emergence almost a century ago, they must be understood in 
their historical context. Current challenges posed by international or 
supranational organizations like the European Union, and the development 
of international law in general, overburden these outdated theories. 
A. Dualism 
The international and national legal orders are 'two circles, which possibly 
touch, but never cross each other'.16 This is the famous statement by 
Heinrich Triepel which forms the cornerstone of the dualistic divide of 
international (or EU) and national law. Dualism's divide of legal orders was 
primarily based on the view that the law of the international (or EU) and the 
national legal orders emanates from different sources, leading to the 
                                                 
14 German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 123, 267 (Lisbon) 30.6.2009. For an 
overview, see Gerhard van der Schyff, 'EU Member State Constitutional Identity: A 
Comparison of Germany and the Netherlands as Polar Opposites' (2016) 76 
Heidelberg Journal of International Law 167-91. 
15 Kirchmair (n 2). 
16 Heinrich Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (C.L. Hirschfeld 1899) 111 (emphasis 
omitted) (translation in the text by the author). 
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supposition that international (EU law) and national law have arisen from 
different legal orders relying on different grounds for validity.17 Although it 
still holds true that international, EU and national law emanate from 
different sources, dualism also assumes that the addressees and content of 
international and national law cannot be identical.18 Thereby, dualism turns a 
blind eye towards the direct interaction between international law and 
individuals. It does so by stating that international law is purely inter-State 
law and can only stipulate obligations for States,19 which does not share the 
same addressees with EU or national law.20 The division of the legal systems 
implies that international law may not derogate from national law, and 
national law may not derogate from international law.21 In order to give 
international law an effect within a national legal system, dualism demands a 
special procedure to transform or incorporate the international norm into a 
national norm.22 As a result, the ground of validity of international law within 
national law rests solely within national law, and the ground of validity of EU 
law within national law rests too solely within national law. 
                                                 
17 Dionisio Anzilotti, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts (W. de Gruyter 1929, German 
translation by Cornelia Bruns and Karl Schmid) 38-39. 
18 Triepel (n 16) 9, 11, 228-229; Anzilotti (n 17) 41-42. 
19 Triepel (n 16) 228-229, 119-120, 271; Anzilotti (n 17) 41 ff;  Gustav A. Walz, Völkerrecht 
und staatliches Recht: Untersuchung über die Einwirkungen des Völkerrechts auf das 
innerstaatliche Recht (W. Kohlhammer 1933) 238-239, who was considered to be a 
moderate dualist, yet he did not postulate the impossibility of international law 
addressing individuals, but stated in 1933 that the character of international law at 
the time was mediatized through municipal law.  
20 This criticism was already expressed by Alfred Verdross, 'Die normative 
Verknüpfung von Völkerrecht und staatlichem Recht' in Max Imboden et al. (eds), 
Festschrift für Adolf Julius Merkl zum 80. Geburtstag (Wilhelm Fink 1970) 425, 432 ff; 
Riccardo P. Mazzeschi, 'The Marginal Role of the Individual in the ILC's Articles 
on State Responsibility' 14 (2004) The Italian Yearbook of International Law 39, 42-
43 with further references in footnote 12, 'This means that international law now 
regulates some relationships between States and individuals in a formal manner (and 
not only in a substantive one)';  ICJ, LaGrand (Germany v. USA), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports [2001], 466, 494, para. 77. 
21 Triepel (n 16) 257-258; Anzilotti (n 17) 38. 
22 Anzilotti (n 17) 41, 45-46. 
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Dualism faces serious difficulties explaining the basis of international or 
supranational organizations, because, according to dualism, there would be 
one international and as many x-national grounds of validity of international 
or supranational organizations as there are Member States.23 In other words, 
the validity of an international organization would have to be divided by its 
Member States instead of having a uniform validity. Equally hard to grasp is 
the concurrent (dualistic) assumption that international, EU and national law 
by default cannot have the same content or addressees.24 This assumption is 
flawed, as it would make the norm conflicts between international, EU and 
national legal orders impossible, which, however, is not the case. Norms from 
overlapping legal orders conflict constantly. If for instance EU law would 
never conflict with national law, the supremacy of EU law would be 
meaningless. 25 
While these flaws are obvious for us today, it was not so when dualism was 
emerging at the turn of the twentieth century. Think only of the dualistic 
assumption that international law (EU law at that time did not even exist) is 
purely inter-State law and so it can only oblige States but not individuals.26 
While this was certainly true when Heinrich Triepel was shaping dualistic 
thinking, this can no longer be perceived as an accurate depiction of 
international law today. International law nowadays also addresses 
individuals directly and shapes national law in many ways.27 Moreover, trying 
to fit EU law and its relationship with international and national law under a 
dualistic scheme seems like squaring the circle, as the dualistic assumptions 
do not match our understanding of EU law, which has at its core supremacy 
and direct effect. If there is a conflict between EU and national law, EU law 
takes precedence over national law. Hence, EU law is binding on national 
                                                 
23 Griller (n 4) 83, 97; see also the general criticism by Joseph G. Starke, 'Monism and 
Dualism in the Theory of International Law' 17 (1936) British Yearbook of 
International Law 66. For an attempt to save dualism, see Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, 
'International law and Interindividual law' in Janne Nijman and André Nollkaemper 
(eds), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 15, 22.  
24 Triepel (n 16) 9, 11, 228-229, 254 ff; Anzilotti (n 17) 41-42. 
25 Kirchmair (n 2) 684 with further references. See III.3.B. 
26 Ibid with further references. 
27 See III.2.(d)(iii). 
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authorities and the ground of validity of EU law is not dependent on national 
law. 
Historically, dualism evinced progress as the separation of international and 
national law helped international law to become independent. Thus, dualism 
liberated international law from being understood as 'external State law',28 
and was even referred to as a 'cleansing thunderstorm' by the monist Alfred 
Verdross.29 In sum, the legal landscape has changed drastically, and the core 
assumptions of dualism are no more correct. As a consequence, dualism fails 
to explain the relationship between international, EU and national law today. 
B. Monism 
The main characteristic of monism is the assumption of a single unified legal 
system. The monism theory was developed most prominently by Georges 
Scelle, Hans Kelsen and Alfred Verdross at the beginning of the 20th 
century.30 Monism faces the criticism of having a highly fictitious 
understanding of the world: nothing less than the 'unity of the legal world 
order' is proclaimed.31 This understanding results from Kelsenian adherence 
to neo-Kantian epistemology, 'because it is only this method [the monist 
concept of law] and its focus on the manner of cognizance, not its objects, 
                                                 
28 For the term 'äußeres Staatsrecht', see Georg W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie 
des Rechts (1821) §§ 330 ff; Kirchmair (n 2) 688. 
29 Alfred Verdross, Die völkerrechtswidrige Kriegshandlung und der Strafanspruch der 
Staaten (Engelmann 1920) 34: ('[R]einigendes Gewitter'). 
30 Hugo Krabbe, Die moderne Staatsidee (Nijhoff 2nd ed. 1919); Léon Duguit, Souveraineté 
et liberté (Éditions La Mémoire du Droit 1922); Georges Scelle, Précis de droit des gens: 
Principes et systématique, Vol. I (Librairie du Recueil Sirey1 932); Hans Kelsen, 'Les 
rapports de système entre le droit interne et le droit international public' 14 (1926) 
Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International, 227, 299; Alfred Verdross, 
'Le fondement du droit international' 16 (1927) Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de 
Droit International, 247, 287; Paul Gragl, Legal Monism: Law, Philosophy, and Politics 
(Oxford University Press 2018); cf. for an overview Christine Amrhein-Hofmann, 
Monismus und Dualismus in den Völkerrechtslehren (Duncker & Humblot 2003) 152 ff. 
31 Alfred Verdross, Die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes auf Grundlage der 
Völkerrechtsverfassung (J.C.B. Mohr 1923); Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Deuticke 
2nd ed 1960) 329; Arangio-Ruiz (n 23) 18, speaking of 'the natural unity of human kind 
… [a]s a matter of pure speculation'. 
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which allows to ascertain a priori how positive law is even possible qua object 
of cognizance and qua object of the legal science'.32 
In cases of norm conflicts, the monistic doctrine needs to deal with the 
question as to which jurisdiction prevails. However, a monistic doctrine, with 
the so-called primacy of national law must be traced back to a very 
nationalistic view of international law, which no longer can be considered 
suitable.33 In other words, how could popular sovereignty in the form of 
national law (and thus one people only) rule over international or EU law 
without denying their law's validity? How should the validity of, say, EU law 
be based on the popular sovereignty of a single member State legal order and 
the popular sovereignty of one nation instead of all member States' legal 
orders and their respective nations?34 For the failure of answering these 
questions, the monistic conception with the primacy of municipal law is left 
aside here. 
Monism with the primacy of international law, on the contrary, has attracted 
a lot more attention. In order to justify the primacy of international law, the 
monistic doctrine stipulated the premise of a hypothetical unity – being kept 
together by the 'chain of validity'.35 The ultimate ground of validity is the 
famous basic norm of Hans Kelsen.36 Briefly, the basic norm is a hypothetical 
                                                 
32 Paul Gragl, 'The Pure Theory of Law and Legal Monism – Epistemological Truth 
and Empirical Plausibility' (2015) 70(4) Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 665-736, 
668-669 (italics original; footnotes omitted) with further references. 
33 Kirchmair (n 2) 688. Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des 
Völkerrechts: Beitrag zu einer Reinen Rechtslehre (J.C.B. Mohr 2nd ed. 1928) 317, himself 
equated the monistic doctrine with the primacy of national law as the 'negation of all 
law'. However, later on he left the decision up to politics, see Kelsen (n 31) 339 ff. 
34 Compare also Walz (n 19) 40, who classified this perception of monism as 
'pseudomonistic'; see also Starke (n 23) 77, where he stated, '[r]educed to its lowest 
terms, the doctrine of State primacy is a denial of international law as law, and an 
affirmation of international anarchy.' 
35 The term 'chain of validity' stems from Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System: An 
Introduction to the Theory of Legal System (Oxford University Press 2nd ed 1980) 105;  
Starke (n 23) 75; Catherine Richmond, 'Preserving the Identity Crisis: Autonomy, 
System and Sovereignty in European Law' (1997) 16(4) Law and Philosophy 377, 388.  
36 Kelsen (n 31) 196 ff. 
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concept, which accounts for the unifying foundation of law and its validity.37 
The basic norm is a dazzling concept, which found many diverging 
interpretations by admirers38 and critics.39 The concept of the 'chain of 
validity' is even more troublesome.40 Kelsen holds that '[a] norm of general 
international law authorizes an individual or a group of individuals on the 
basis of an effective constitution, to create and apply as a legitimate 
government a normative coercive order. That norm [of general international 
law], thus, legitimates this coercive order [of a 'state' in the meaning of 
international law] for the territory of its actual effectiveness as a valid legal 
order and the community constituted by this coercive order as a 'state' in the 
sense of international law'.41 Similarly Verdross argues from the viewpoint of 
an international basic norm from which also municipal law derives: 'The 
freedom of States is nothing else than a margin of discretion depending on 
                                                 
37 For a brief explanation, see Gragl (n 32) 671-673. 
38 Robert Walter, 'Entstehung und Entwicklung des Gedankens der Grundnorm' in 
Robert Walter (ed), Schwerpunkte der Reinen Rechtslehre (Manz 1992) 47; Robert 
Walter, 'Die Grundnorm im System der Reinen Rechtslehre' in Aulis Aarnio et al. 
(eds), Rechtsnorm und Rechtswirklichkeit: Festschrift für Werner Krawietz (Duncker & 
Humblot 1993) 85; Heinz Mayer, 'Rechtstheorie und Rechtspraxis' in Clemens 
Jabloner and Friedrich Stadler (eds), Logischer Empirismus und Reine Rechtslehre: 
Beziehungen zwischen dem Wiener Kreis und der Hans Kelsen Schule (Springer 2002) 319; 
Ralf Dreier, 'Bemerkungen zur Theorie der Grundnorm' in Hans Kelsen-Institut 
(ed), Die Reine Rechtslehre in wissenschaftlicher Diskussion (Manz 1982) 38, 39, note the 
'function of the basic norm stipulating unity' 
39 Norbert Hoerster, Was ist Recht?: Grundfragen der Rechtsphilosophie (C.H. Beck 2006) 
134, 138 ff; Peter Koller, 'Meilensteine des Rechtspositivismus im 20. Jahrhundert: 
Hans Kelsens Reine Rechtslehre und H. L. A. Harts 'Concept of Law' in Ota 
Weinberger and Werner Krawietz (eds), Reine Rechtslehre im Spiegel ihrer Fortsetzer 
und Kritiker (Springer 1988) 129, 157 ff; Griller (n 4) 87-89; Werner Schroeder, Das 
Gemeinschaftsrechtssystem: Eine Untersuchung zu den rechtsdogmatischen, 
rechtstheoretischen und verfassungsrechtlichen Grundlagen des Systemdenkens im 
Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2002) 75 ff. 
40 For criticism, see András Jakab, 'Problems of the Stufenbaulehre: Kelsen's Failure to 
Derive the Validity of a Norm from Another Norm' (2007) 20 (1) Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence 35-67. 
41 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press M. Knight trans. 
of Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed. 1960, 1967, reprinted 1978), 193-215, 215. 
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international law'.'42 According to him, the lawmakers of public international 
law are not States, but the international community, acting through an 
international organ with supranational power.43 
Following this idea that norms can only derive from other norms, the 
conclusion drawn would have to be that any national law is derived from EU 
law, and EU and national law from international law.  This, however, is an 
argument, which does not reflect reality.44 Indeed, the CJEU famously 
postulated the 'autonomy of the Community legal order'45 and introduced 
the 'direct effect'46 of EU law, which has been interpreted by some voices as 
a monistic approach.47 Nevertheless, it would be, even for the most 
progressive EU Constitutional lawyers, a step too far to argue that all MS legal 
orders derive from EU law. 
The fatal blow for monism with regards to EU law is the relationship between 
EU law and international law, which appears to show even dualistic 
elements.48 This 'Janus face' is inconsequent—at least when trying to uphold 
the underlying assumptions of Monism and Dualism.49 
While it is important to consider the current dichotomy of legal sources of 
international, EU and national law, a common normative framework is 
equally important. Such a framework is necessary to acknowledge the 
intertwinements of those three legal orders and to enable a norm conflict 
solution for the norm conflicts arising from this intertwinement. Hence, the 
changes in the legal landscape forces us to leave behind the almost one-
                                                 
42 Verdross (n 8) 35 (translated by the author). 
43 Verdross (n 8) 48 ff. But see Krabbe (n 31) 305-309. 
44 For criticism of the other monistic concept with the primacy of national law (which 
would consequently make international and supranational law governed by almost 
200 diverging national laws), see Kirchmair (n 2) 681 note 12. 
45 Case C-6/64 Costa v ENEL ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; Case C-284/16 Slovak Republic v 
Achmea BV ECLI:EU:C:2018:158 para 33. 
46 Case C-26/62 Van Gend & Loos ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. 
47 Kirchmair (n 2) 680 with further references in note 10. 
48 Compare only Case C-402 & C-415/05P, Kadi v Commission EU:C:2008:461: UN law 
and EU law 'originate from distinct legal orders'. Cf Kirchmair (n 2) 683-5 with 
further references. 
49 See for this conclusion in more detail Kirchmair (n 2) 685-90. 
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hundred-year-old theories of monism and dualism. Major developments 
force us to seek an adequate theoretical framework which fits the reality of 
our time. 
Main claims of dualism and monism are summarized in the following table. 
Table 1: Dualism & monism overview  
 Dualism Monism 
Presuppositions International and national 
law have: 
- different 
addressees; 
- different content 
(international law is 
purely inter-State 
law); 
- different sources. 
Neo-Kantian epistemology 
('manner of cognizance 
constitutes the object'). 
Norms can only derive from 
other norms. 
Theoretical 
Outcome 
International and national 
legal orders are 
- separated ('two 
circles, which 
possibly touch, but 
never cross each 
other', Triepel) and 
- based on different 
grounds of validity. 
If international law is law, 
the logical consequence is 
that both national and 
international law must be 
seen as a unitary legal order 
('unity of the legal world 
order', Verdross). 
Either international/EU law 
derives from national law or 
national law derives from 
international/EU law. 
Legal 
Consequences 
Norms must be 
incorporated from one 
legal order into another. 
Legal subjectivity of 
international organizations 
(be it the UN or the EU) 
would have one 
Chain of validity ('Stufenbau 
nach der rechtlichen 
Bedingtheit'). 
Ultimate ground of validity 
is the famous basic norm 
('Grundnorm'). 
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international and x-
national grounds of 
validity.  
Failure Presuppositions outdated. Remains a theory focused on 
epistemology. 
Norm conflict solution is 
highly hypothetical. 
2. Global Legal Pluralism 
Another very prominent and more recent account of legal orders and their 
relationship is global legal pluralism.50 Eugen Ehrlich studied, as he put it, the 
'living law' of the Bukovina at the beginning of the 20th century.51 Because of 
his seminal studies Ehrlich is nowadays referred to as one, if not the founding 
father of legal sociology.52 Triggered by the findings of Ehrlich, a common 
understanding of pluralism is nowadays 'the presence in a social field of more 
than one legal order'.53 From the vantage point of two different legal 
authorities present in the same social field, which can also be found to exist 
in colonial situations, 'legal pluralism' also became a key concept in 
                                                 
50 Paul S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (Oxford 
University Press 2012); Mireille Delmas-Marty, Les forces imaginantes du droit (II): Le 
pluralisme ordonné (SEUIL 2006); Mireille Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism: A 
Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational Legal World (Hart Naomi 
Norberg trans 2009) 44; Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure 
of Postnational Law (Oxford University Press 2010); giving an overview Ralf Michaels, 
'Global legal pluralism' (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 243–262. 
51 Eugen Ehrlich, Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts (Duncker & Humblot  1913) 313. 
52 Manfred Rehbinder, Die Begründung der deutschen Rechtssoziologie durch Eugen Ehrlich 
(Duncker & Humblot 2nd ed 1986). 
53 John Griffiths, 'What is legal pluralism?' (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1–47; 
Sally Engle Merry, 'Legal Pluralism' (1988) 22 Law & Society Review 869–896; 
Jacques Vanderlinden, 'Le pluralisme juridique: essai de synthèse' in John Gilissen 
(ed) Le Pluralisme juridique (Université Libre de Bruxelles 1971) 19–56, 19. 
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international law.54 Roughly from the 1990s onwards, legal scholarship began 
to embrace the notion of legal pluralism. Berman describes the shift from 
anthropologically orientated studies towards what he coins 'global legal 
pluralism' as follows: Formerly, studies were aimed at two distinct legal orders 
within the same territory, where usually one legal order was hierarchically 
superior to the other. Moving away from this hierarchical understanding, 
legal scholars started to understand these different legal orders as 
'bidirectional, with each influencing (and helping to constitute) the other'.55 
Global legal pluralism correctly describes the massive increase in 
international actors, norms and tribunals as well as adjudicators. Following 
this descriptive analysis an important question is how we ought to deal with 
or even solve those legal conflicts resulting from plural, overlapping legal 
claims. In this regard, it is striking to see that pluralists tend to oversimplify 
and exaggerate contrasting positions: 'sovereigntists' stand against 
'universalists'56 and are then mediated by a 'pluralist framework'. Such 
framework is for instance conceptualised by Berman through his 
'jurisgenerative constitutionalism'.57 In other words, 'instead of trying to 
erase conflict, [he] seeks to manage it'.58 To 'manage' norm conflicts he 
reviews a series of 'principles' which are of a procedural nature, instead of 
being substantial; namely these are 'procedural mechanisms, institutions, and 
practices'.59 Likewise the French pluralist, Mireille Delmas-Marty, contrasts 
                                                 
54 Brian Z. Tamanaha, 'Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to 
Global' (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 375–411, 390; Paul S. Berman, 'Global Legal 
Pluralism' (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review 1155–1238, 1170. 
55 Ibid 1171. 
56 See the exaggerations made by Berman (n 54) 1180 stating that sovereigntists 'reject 
the legitimacy of all communities but the territorially-defined nation-state' and have 
(at 1180) 'intrinsic reason to privilege nation-state communities over others', 
contrasting it with a radical universalist position stating (at 1189) that '[i]n contrast 
to a reassertion of territorial prerogative, a universalist vision tends to respond to 
normative conflict by seeking to erase normative difference altogether.' 
57 Paul S. Berman, 'Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism: Procedural Principles for 
Managing Global Legal Pluralism' (2013) 20 (2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 665-695. 
58 Berman (n 56) 1192; Berman (50) 145. 
59 Berman (n 56) 1192, and esp. 1196 ff. as well as Berman (50) 145, and esp. 152 ff. 
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'utopian unity' with an 'illusion of autonomy'60 in order to propose to solve or 
soften this disparity with national margins of appreciation to order 
pluralism.61 As an example she mentions the principle of subsidiarity in the 
law of the European Union.62 Even though the suggested solutions to manage 
or soften norm conflicts are rather restrictive and argue, for instance in the 
case of Berman, only in favour of some procedural rules (neglecting any 
hierarchical fundamental norms), such claims remain in the realm of ought. 
Prescriptive claims which hold that these rules should be valid in order to 
settle norm conflicts need to be well justified. By moving in the realm of ought, 
the suggested solutions are also confronted with such problems, that even 
reductionist procedural mechanisms might be accused of having a strong 
normative flavour. Thus, also proposals for thin procedural mechanisms are 
also somewhat overarching substantial value claims.63 
Samantha Besson in turn suggests that democracy 'ought rather to be the 
supercriterion' because of its superior legitimacy when 'deciding on the 
others'. Yet, also she is aware that identifying democracy in international and 
national norms 'remains extremely complex'.64 And, one might wish to add, 
democracy is not always the super-criterion of legal orders whose norms 
                                                 
60 Delmas-Marty (n 50) 44. 
61 Delmas-Marty (n 50) 44. 
62 Delmas-Marty (n 50) 45-46. 
63 For this critique of Berman, see Alexis Galán and Dennis Patterson, 'The limits of 
normative legal pluralism: Review of Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A 
Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders' (2013) 11 (3) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 783-800, esp. at 793 ff. For a response see Paul S. Berman, 'How 
legal pluralism is and is not distinct from liberalism: A response to Alexis Galán and 
Dennis Patterson' (2013) 11 (3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 801-808. 
C.f. further critically also Ralf Michaels, 'On liberalism and legal pluralism' in Miguel 
Maduro, Kaarlo Tuori and Suvi Sankari (eds.) Transnational Law: Rethinking European 
Law and Legal Thinking (Cambridge University Press 2014) 122-142, 141: 'his 
[Berman's] managerialism also presupposes some superior position from which such 
management is possible.' 
64 Samantha Besson, 'Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism, 
and Democracy' in Jeffrey L. Dunhoff and Joel P. Trachtman (eds.) Ruling the world? 
Constitutionalism, international law, and global governance (Cambridge University Press, 
2009) 381-408, 405. 
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might be in conflict. In Krisch's account, a somewhat exaggerated65 
'foundational constitutionalism' stands against 'softer network forms of 
international cooperation' which are, again, mediated by pluralism.66 So even 
the most radical pluralist, Krisch, bases the norm conflict resolution—at least 
in some cases—upon what he calls 'the construction of interface norms'.67 In his 
opinion, the pluralism is about orders which are linked and know certain 
forms of common decision-making.68 Thus, also for him, there ought to be 
certain norms ('interface norms'), which 'regulate to what extent norms and 
decisions in one sub-order have effect in another'.69 Yet, he immediately falls 
back on his radical pluralism when saying that these rules are established by 
each order for itself including steady risk of conflict.70 His main argument is 
that in the post-national sphere '[u]nder conditions of strong fluidity and 
contestation, conflict rules face serious problems of adaptation to a changing 
environment' and 'are unlikely to be able to truly settle conflicts—they might 
remain ineffectual or even enflame conflicts further.'71 However, the 
consequence is that we actually lack a common (normative) norm conflict 
solution. 
From this very brief overview we can conclude that most of the pluralists also 
think that there should be some kind of rules to assist norm conflict 
resolution. I argue in brief, that the question as to how we ought to deal with 
or even solve those legal conflicts (based on a (common) framework) resulting 
from plural, overlapping legal claims is quite different from a descriptive 
analysis. Already the identification of a conflict necessarily implies an 
overarching system.72 It is important to sharply distinguish between a 
                                                 
65 See for this criticism Gregory Schaffer, 'A Transnational Take on Krisch's Pluralist 
Postnational Law' (2012) 23 (2) European Journal of International Law 565-582. 
66 Krisch (n 50) 300, 183. 
67 Krisch (n 50) 285 ff. [italics added by the author]. 
68 Krisch (n 50) 288. 
69 Ibid, 285. 
70 Ibid, 286. However, note also that Krisch states later (p. 312) that these norms stem 
from the sub orders (at p. 286) and might clash. 
71 Nico Krisch, 'Who is afraid of radical pluralism? Legal Order and Political Stability 
in the Postnational Space' (2011) 24 Ratio Juris 386-412, 407.  
72 Alexander Somek, 'Monism: A tale of the undead' in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek 
(eds) Constitutional pluralism in the European Union (Hart 2012) 343-79. 
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descriptive analysis and a prescriptive proposal for norm conflict resolution. 
Moreover, I hold that such an overarching normative framework for norm 
conflict resolution needs to be a common normative framework of all 
overlapping legal orders.  
Some pluralists might claim that they envision 'common' approaches. Still, I 
would answer that anything which is called plural can hardly provide for a 
genuinely common normative framework. I argue that it is more accurate to 
either stay within a purely descriptive analysis of current facts and describe 
them as pluralistic or move from descriptions to prescriptions. In other 
words, one must take account of arguing now in the realm of ought, by 
introducing, for instance, the thought that we ought to avoid conflicts, and, if 
they occur, that we ought to cooperate somehow to solve or mitigate them. 
This is what I think is the very first prescriptive step in the (global) legal 
pluralism debate.73 Norm conflict identification and proper resolution must 
be based on a genuinely common normative framework which encompasses 
all affected legal orders. That means that a pluralistic picture without a 
common normative framework has no normative (legal) guidance for finding 
the final arbiter in legal norm conflicts.74 
Although global legal pluralism may provide a coherent descriptive account 
of current legal developments, it lacks a satisfying common prescriptive 
account. Accordingly, claims (for how to solve or why not to solve norm 
conflicts) which solely rest on the description of pluralistic orders do not 
suffice as a basis for a normative account. If approaches of legal pluralism 
resort to some sort of 'meta norms or principles' to solve norm conflicts,75 
                                                 
73 For a powerful critique of the hidden 'common point of reference' in pluralistic 
accounts see Klaus Günther, 'Normative legal pluralism – a critique', paper presented 
at the 'Philosophical foundations of global law' conference at the University of Cartagena, 
Colombia on 25 August 2016 (on file with the author). See also Klaus Günther, 
'Normativer Rechtspluralismus: Eine Kritik' in Thorsten Moos, Magnus Schlette 
and Hans Diefenbacher (eds) Das Recht im Blick der Anderen: Zu Ehren von Eberhard 
Schmidt-Aßmann (Mohr Siebeck 2016) 43-62. 
74 Gragl (n 32) 693-695. 
75 Compare Berman (n 77) 665–95, with Delmas-Marty (n 50). With regards to 
constitutional pluralism, see Mattias Kumm, 'The Moral Point of Constitutional 
Pluralism' in Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of 
European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 216, 220. 
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they too will need to justify these principles and to give reasons for such 
common accounts. Otherwise power asymmetries are difficult to avoid. The 
warning by Klaus Günther is pertinent in this debate: 'Historical experience 
teaches us that a pluralism of normative orders can rapidly become the victim 
of power asymmetries, or even bring forth such asymmetries'.76 
3. Global Constitutionalism 
Before moving onto my own proposal, another brief section devoted to global 
constitutionalism is in order. Constitutionalism on a global, supranational, 
and national level is an important and wide-ranging concept. Due to the 
successful emergence of 'global constitutionalism' as a movement and 
interdisciplinary discipline many diverging issues are discussed under this 
influential label since its breakthrough in the 21st century.77 Global 
Constitutionalism, as much as Constitutionalism, shares the aspiration of 
establishment as well as the normative guidance and limitation of 
governmental power. In other words, Constitutionalism 'refers to 
governance according to constitutional principles'.78 We speak, thus, of a 
discourse which involves the 'framing, constituting, regulating, and limiting 
[of] power'79 – be it either in a thin or in a thicker form.80 The 
constitutionalization of international law is a project which is mainly 
interested in the substantial development of international law in the form of 
constitutional norms or principles (or of constitutional norms or principles 
of the EU for instance).81 Constitutionalism therefore is usually connected to 
certain key legal concepts such as the rule of law, human rights, democracy, 
                                                 
76 Günther (n 73). 
77 Anne Peters, 'Constitutionalisation', Max Planck Research Paper Series No. 2017-
08, 1, forthcoming in Jean d' Aspremont and Sahib Singh (eds) Concepts for 
International Law - Contributions to Disciplinary Thought (Edward Elgar).  
78 Jaako Husa, 'Global Constitutionalism – A critical view', Maastricht European 
Private Law Institute Working Paper No. 2016/11. 
79 Jean L. Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty. Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and 
Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2012) 76. 
80 Wil Waluchow, 'Constitutionalism' in Edward N. Zalta (ed) The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2017). 
81 For a critical overview of 'world constitutionalism', Diggelmann and Altwicker (n 8). 
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and inhibits a materially substantiated form of how law should be.82 Very 
often also a strong universal flavour is attached to such concepts on a global 
perspective.  
Global Constitutionalism is facing a challenge brought by descriptive legal 
pluralism: solutions to norm conflicts might differ depending on the context. 
Thus, another context, so goes the main argument of contextualization, asks 
for different solutions as different conditions are in place.83 Once we reveal 
that the very first prescriptive question is what we ought to do with norm 
conflicts, there are very likely to be very different solutions to different 
conflicts (and different legal orders involved) depending on the context.84 
This is acknowledged by understanding constitutionalism as a fragmented 
and contextualized concept,85 'a relatively consolidated form of global 
constitutionalism',86 or to a certain extent also by Constitutional Pluralism.87 
                                                 
82 For legal key concepts, see Jakab (n 9). 
83 For such a critique of the pluralistic account of Nico Krisch see also Schaffer (n 65) 
579: 'The positive, empirically-grounded study of transnational legal ordering, in 
contrast, is important for building a normative approach grounded in philosophical 
pragmatism which recognizes the need for institutional variation in response to 
different contexts'. 
84 For a similar argument see also Emmanuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law: Legal Theory 
and the Space for Legal Pluralism (Ashgate 2009), ch. 3 relying on Robert M. Cover, 
The supreme court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and narrative, 97 (4) Harvard Law 
Review, 1983, pp. 4-68; and Robert M. Cover, 'Violence and the word', 95 Yale Law 
Journal, 1986, 1601-1629. However, it is important to highlight that my claim for 
contextualization is much simpler and thus less overladen than the claim Melissaris 
is making. While Melissaris's main target is a sceptical view of State law—or at least 
the link between State and law which is unnecessary in his eyes—my argument here 
is simply that when facing normative conflicts there are much likely to be various 
different solutions to deal with the conflict depending on the context. Thus I argue 
against a single — sometimes even not very clear prescriptive — claim of dealing with 
normative conflicts in the pluralistic world. 
85 Peters (n 77). 
86 Turkuler Isiksel, 'Global Legal Pluralism as Fact and Norm' (2013) 2 Global 
Constitutionalism 160-195, 190. 
87 See only Neil Walker, 'The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism' (2002) The Modern 
Law Review 65 (3) 317-359. 
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What still remains problematic is the specific request for constitutional norms, 
rules and principles. The relationship between legal orders must not always 
be of a constitutional dimension. Moreover, despite the fact that a 
relationship between different legal orders must not be guided by one specific 
constitution, there might still exist a legal relationship between certain legal 
orders. This holds true, even if we can speak of a Member State legal order as 
a constitutional order, and the EU legal order as a constitutional order. It is 
challenging to determine the relationship between these legal orders as it 
requires to establish which constitutional system has the final say. 
Very likely, we will fall back to a sort of non-hierarchical relationship of the 
involved constitutional systems in order to avoid a subordination of one order 
under another. Trying to resolve these questions on a constitutional level 
might thus very likely lead to a 'constitutional stalemate'. 
Therefore, I am sceptical about constitutionalism being a helpful concept 
with regard to the challenge of resolving norm conflicts between overlapping 
international, EU, and national legal orders. I doubt that constitutionalism is 
an appropriate concept to guide legal norm conflict resolution of those 
overlapping but different legal orders. On a global scale, we are well advised 
to take the descriptive account of global legal pluralism seriously. The 
massive increase in international actors, norms and tribunals, as well as 
adjudicators, simply makes it very difficult to speak of constitutionalism de 
lege lata (without definitely excluding the possible existence of a thin layer of 
global constitutionalism). A cautious assessment is that constitutionalism 
presumes too many substantial values for the envisaged common normative 
denominator in order to be a helpful concept for norm conflict solution 
arising out of the relationship between international, EU and national law.88 
                                                 
88 Michael Perry, A global political morality: Human rights, democracy, and constitutionalism 
(Cambridge University Press 2017), which envisages 'agapic sensibility' as the 
foundation for human dignity. Perry's statement illustrates how difficult such 
universal legal standards are 'this book is about the political morality of human rights 
[…] not about the international law of human rights' (italics original), p.2. For a critical 
account of the current state of EU 'constitutionalization', see Dieter Grimm, 'The 
democratic costs of constitutionalization: The European case' in Dieter Grimm, 
Constitutionalism. Past, present, and future (Oxford University Press 2015) 295. 
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If we agree that norm conflicts from different but overlapping legal orders 
should be avoided and if they appear that they should be resolved, then we 
need to look for appropriate concepts for such a task. I argue that we are in 
need of a common normative (legal) framework for resolution. Common in 
the sense that this normative framework is brought about in agreement by all 
affected legal orders. In other words, if we agree that 'stronger state[s should 
not be able to] lawfully force a constitutional position on another state or a 
stronger court on a weaker court, without any legal redress'.89 Then, we are in 
need of such a common normative concept. Still, this article takes the stand 
that constitutionalism is not directly helpful for our question of the 
relationship of legal orders either.90 Constitutionalization is more interested 
in the substantial development of international law in the form of 
constitutional norms or principles (or of constitutional norms of principles 
of the EU for instance) than in explaining the relationship between 
international, EU and national law.91 
Table 2: Global Legal Pluralism & Global Constitutionalism overview:  
  Global Legal Pluralism Global Constitutionalism 
Presuppositions - Norm conflicts are 
positive. 
- Focus on a descriptive 
account. 
- Common values (and 
further necessities for 
constitutional unity). 
- Universality (at least for 
the claimed legal orders). 
Theoretical 
Outcome 
- Description of pluralistic 
orders as the basis for a 
normative account for 
norm conflict solution. 
- The Constitution guides 
all embraced legal 
orders/norm conflicts. 
                                                 
89 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, 'Cosmopolitan Legitimacy', paper presented at the 'Philosophical 
foundations of global law' conference at the University of Cartagena, Colombia on 25 
August 2016 (on file with the author). 
90 Alexander Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution (Oxford University Press 2014) 
writing in the preface that 'Greater 'constitutionalization' of supranational or even 
international law threatens to rob constitutionalism of its political core.' 
91 Klabbers (n 8) simply presuming it; Thomas Kleinlein, Konstitutionalisierung im 
Völkerrecht (Springer 2012), refraining from strong normative claims. For a critical 
overview of 'world constitutionalism', Diggelmann and Altwicker (n 8). 
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Legal 
Consequences 
- Potential norm 
conflicts without a 
common solution 
(individuals might face 
contradictory claims). 
- Always constitutional 
(depending on the content 
of the constitution). 
Failure - No satisfactory 
common account for 
norm conflict solution. 
- Descriptive accuracy, 
but normatively wanting. 
- Praise of norm conflicts 
without a common 
solution. 
- Presuppositions are too 
demanding ('burden of 
universality'). 
- Not flexible enough for 
diverging contexts. 
4. An Intermediate Conclusion 
A critical approach towards the theories of dualism and monism is now quite 
common.92 However, this does not mean that some elements of these 
theories cannot be applied in a meaningful way and thereby they might still 
be useful tools to understand specific processes of the relationship between 
international, EU and national law.93 And, despite all the criticism these 
theories faced, their persistence is remarkable. Dualism as well as monism are 
still referred to in many textbooks, they are present in case law,94 and in 
scholarly work.95 Also in practice, many (national) legal orders are still often 
referred to as being 'dualistic' or 'monistic'. Thus, there is a need to make the 
critical points as clear as possible in order to explain why they are of no help 
in answering the question posed by this article.  
                                                 
92 Armin von Bogdandy, 'Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the 
Relationship between International and Domestic Constitutional Law' (2008) 6 
ICON 397, 400 denoting those theories 'intellectual zombies'; Kirchmair (n 2);  
Lando Kirchmair, 'Is the EU legal order the tombstone of the dualistic and the 
monistic doctrine?' in Michael Thaler and Michel Verpeaux (eds), La recherche en 
droit constitutionnel comparé (L'Harmattan 2014) 71-86. 
93 Jakab (n 40). 
94 The German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE, 111, 307 (Görgülü). 
95 Gragl (n 32); as well as Paul Gragl, 'In defence of Kelsenian Monism: Countering Hart 
and Raz' (2017) 8(2) Jurisprudence 287-318.  
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Moreover, this article holds that (global) legal pluralism cannot offer a 
satisfying normative account for norm conflict resolution between 
international, EU and national law either. Hence, prescriptive proposals to 
solve legal conflicts arising from different legal orders on the global plane are 
better not termed 'pluralistic'. I shall suggest in this article that it is more 
precise to refer to a necessarily common framework which addresses the 
question as to how those conflicts should be resolved together or at least in a 
way acceptable to all parties. 
Finally, this article holds that this common framework depends hugely on the 
context. Thus, solutions are more likely to be found if we focus on specific 
contexts instead of trying to provide universal solutions for different 
situations. This is the reason why global constitutionalism or global law 
cannot provide universal solutions for norm conflict resolution between 
international, EU and national law. They do not take the 'burden of 
universality' seriously enough or end in a 'constitutional stalemate'. Broadly 
speaking, this is because it is usually far too difficult in our highly complex 
and dynamic world to come up with global or truly universal solutions. 
If my analysis so far is correct, then all major theories on the relationship 
between legal orders suffer from serious flaws when trying to answer the 
question as to where to find the decisive source in legal norm conflicts. At the 
same time, a sound theoretical concept is essential for the relationship 
between legal orders. Hence, I propose my own theoretical concept: the 
theory of the law creators' circle. Arguably, this concept provides a sound 
theoretical foundation without becoming ensnared in the flaws attributed to 
the existing theories, and it should provide a correct answer to the question 
posed. 
III. TLCC – A STRUCTURAL ANSWER 
My aim, with what I call the theory of the law creators' circle, is to 
conceptualize in a very abstract way how we could principally design or, 
rather, understand the structural relationship between legal orders in general. 
The goal is to obtain a common denominator which is abstract enough to 
capture principal issues of relationships between legal orders but still 
provides enough normative guidance in order to bring about concrete results. 
How particular situations are analyzed might then differ significantly 
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depending on which context we are looking at. Only then we are able to 
answer the question as to how we can know who has the final say. 
1. The Underlying Understanding of Law 
In order to analyze the relationship between international, EU and national 
law properly, I establish a working hypothesis: a common denominator of 
international, EU and national law must be stipulated to enable a transparent 
and methodologically coherent analysis of the relationship. The legal concept 
underlying the theory of the law creators' circle96 concentrates on those legal 
aspects especially relevant for the relationship between international, EU 
and national law. Because international law, EU law and national law are 
different legal fields to a certain extent, an abstract understanding of law is 
necessary in order to include all three fields under one common denominator. 
The common denominator is vital because it enables a comparison of those 
different fields. In order to avoid using sociological, anthropological, 
psychological or other reasoning embedded in natural sciences,97 a 
hypothetical basis is assumed.98  
                                                 
96 For an extensive account of this theory as applied to the relationship between public 
international law and the Austrian legal order, see Kirchmair (n 12). For an 
introduction to the theory (and further references) and its application to 
international treaties and their relationship to the Austrian as well as the Hungarian 
legal order as well as the former abbreviation TREK, from the German term 'Die 
Theorie des Rechtserzeugerkreises', see Kirchmair (n 10), which is an early version 
of chapter III of this Article. 
97 Jan Klabbers, An introduction to international institutional law (Cambridge University 
Press 2002) 34; Lando Kirchmair, 'How (not) to argue for the relation between 
natural sciences and law: Why the thesis of an innate 'Universal Moral Grammar' and 
its relevance for law as argued by John Mikhail fails' (forthcoming) Archiv für Rechts- 
und Sozialphilosophie. 
98 See also Loos arguing that legal science as much as social sciences pursue meaningful 
consequences based on hypothetically presumed values (which makes them 
normative sciences), Fritz Loos, Zur Wert- und Rechtslehre Webers (Mohr Siebeck 
1970) 111. For the change from a real to a hypothetical contract, see Koller (n 99) 14, 
who quotes Immanuel Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: 'Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, 
taugt aber nicht für die Praxis' (Berlinische Monatsschrift 1793) 153 as the first to 
express the fiction of a social contract.  
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The definition of law as well as its origins start in the 'legal desert'.99 The legal 
desert shall be understood as a legal vacuum: a neutral, pre-legal state without 
any further specifications. Of course, such a starting point provokes reflexive 
associations to social contract theories. The legal desert was considered 
empirically as an anarchic state in which everyone is at war with everyone else, 
famously expressed as the 'state of nature' by Thomas Hobbes.100 Natural 
rights were conceived to be already existing and just to be protected by a 
social contract by John Locke.101 Jean-Jacques Rousseau thought it necessary 
to discard everyone from their property in order to enable the formation of 
the 'volonté générale',102 which is considered to be a prerequisite for the 
formation of common interests in the first place. 
As I do not focus on how a just society can be conceived, the following 
assumption shall suffice: in the legal desert, a consensus between two or more 
individuals is widely considered to be the possibility which allows the 
establishment of a binding legal rule to organize cohabitation.103 Consensus 
thereby is understood to serve as a tool for objectification of individual 
interests104 and does not aim to establish any values or tools that might 
                                                 
99 Compare the theories of the social contract summarized by Peter Koller, Neue 
Theorien des Sozialkontrakts (Duncker & Humblot 1987). 
100 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651, Leviathan, German translation by J. Schlösser 1996) 
96 ff. 
101 John Locke, Zwei Abhandlungen über die Regierung (1690 Two Treatises of 
Government, German translation by H. J. Hoffmann 1977) 201 ff. 
102 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Vom Gesellschaftsvertrag oder Grundsätze des Staatsrechts (1762, 
Du contract social; ou principes du droit politique, German translation by H. 
Brockard 1986) 1. book, 6. chapter, 17 f.; Koller (n 99) 25. 
103 Kirchmair (n 12) 46 ff. Compare thereto also Weinberger's argument aiming at 
disclosing natural law based theories arguing that legal positivism originates from 
non-cognitivism holding that it is impossible to cognize right law and justify norms 
cognitively Otta Weinberger, Norm und Institution – eine Einführung in die Theorie des 
Rechts (Manz 1988) 72 f. 
104 The notion of objectivity therefore refers only to an approximation to objectivity. 
Compare also discourse theory Robert Alexy, 'Diskurstheorie und Menschenrechte' 
in Robert Alexy (ed), Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs – Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie 
(Suhrkamp 1995) 127, 129 who circumscribes discourse theory as a procedural theory 
of practical validity. Jürgen Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen (2nd ed. 
Suhrkamp 1997) 299f; Jürgen Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation (Suhrkamp 
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indicate how a just society shall be organized. While the point of departure is 
very similar to most social contract theories—the 'legal desert'—the aim of 
this analysis contrasts sharply with the aim of political philosophy as the goal 
of this article is much more moderate. 
Choosing this hypothesis behind the law creators' circle aims at only 
elucidating the structural relationship between international, EU and 
national law without saying how society or the State should be organized (or 
without arguing, for instance, whether the EU has a constitution or not). Yet, 
it is not a descriptive theory basing the law on sociological facts. The TLCC 
is a proposal for normative guidance of norm conflict resolution between 
different legal orders. Whether the hypothetical legal desert is best 
understood by imagining a natural disaster or other events is left to the 
reader's imagination. This hypothetical starting point shall guarantee a 
consistent definition of law. That is, the definition of international law, EU 
law, and national law must be uniform. For if it is not, the norm conflict 
resolution between the different legal orders cannot work properly.105 
Analogous to the historical idea of social contract theory, the consensus 
element is based on the abstract principles of pacta sunt servanda and pacta 
                                                 
1998) 175; and id., Faktizität und Geltung – Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des 
demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Suhrkamp 1992) 138 stating that those regulations are 
legitimate which alle possibly affected persons might approve as participants in 
rational discourse. Seyla Benhabib, 'Another Universalism: On the Unity and 
Diversity of Human Rights' 81 (2007) Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 7, 21. This, however, is not meant to suggest that 
international, EU or national law are the result of a power free rational discourse. It 
merely shall indicate the need to objectify individual interests. 
105 Yet, it is important to clarify that this definition of law is not supposed to be superior 
to any other definition of law. Particularly consent as a source of law has been 
criticised recently. See only Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent 52 (2012) Virginia 
Journal of International Law 747-790. My response regarding this so-called consent 
problem is twofold. First, I argued elsewhere (see, Lando Kirchmair, What came 
first: the obligation or the belief? A renaissance of consensus theory to make the 
normative foundations of customary international law more tangible 59 (2017) 
German Yearbook of International Law 289-319) that there is still something 
beneficial in consent as a source of (customary international) law. Second, the 
definition of law made in this article is due to the task of finding a definition of law 
abstract enough to serve as a common denominator of international, EU and 
national law. 
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tertiis.106 Those principles apply due to pre-legal, reasonable107 reasons. These 
pre-legal principles must not be chosen arbitrarily. Their origin needs to be 
disclosed, because the assumed fiction should not deviate from conceivable 
or even already scientifically proven pre-conditions. The pre-legal 
application of the pacta sunt servanda rule is based on the assumption that all 
individuals participating in a consensus must not deviate from the adopted 
compromise in order not to violate the achieved compromise.108 Another 
motivation not to violate the achieved compromise is that any violation could 
endanger the successful adoption of a future compromise, which, for 
individuals, would again be positive.109  Irrespective of the difference 
between compromise and consensus (not every consensus must be a 
                                                 
106 Koller (n 99) 12f. 
107 John Rawls, Politischer Liberalismus (1998, German translation by Wilfried Hinsch, 
Political liberalism, 1993) 120, note 1. 
108 Norbert Hoerster, Was ist Recht? Grundfragen der Rechtsphilosophie (C. H. Beck 2006) 
133 holding that justification of legal evaluation is reliant to ethical premises which in 
turn are related to a compromise of individual interests. 
109 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (1797) II. main part 
2. Chapter § 19 especially 100 f stating that holding a promise is a postulate of pure 
reason. Compare also John L. Brierly, The law of nations (Oxford University Press 
1963) 56: 'The ultimate explanation of the binding force of all law is that man, 
whether he is a single individual or whether he is associated with other men in a state, 
is constrained, in so far as he is a reasonable being, to believe that order and not chaos 
is the governing principle of the world in which he has to live.' 
C.f. [even though relating to pacta sunt servanda and international treaties] Georg 
Dahm, Völkerrecht, Vol. I (De Gruyter 1958) 12, especially n. 17 holding that the 
minimum set of international legal order must include pacta sunt servanda, which 
holds true for practical reasons. See also Jost Delbrück, ‚Begriff, Geltung u. 
Erscheinungsformen des Völkerrechts' in Georg Dahm et al. (eds), Völkerrecht, Vol. 
I/1 (2nd ed De Gruyter 1989) 27, 37, by saying who counts consens as a source of law 
implies pacta sunt servanda C.f. id., ‚Verbindlichkeit und Geltungsbereich der 
Verträge' in Georg Dahm et al. (eds), Völkerrecht, Vol. I/3 (2nd ed De Gruyter 2002) 
600, 600 f, stating that pacta sunt servanda and pacta tertiis are self-evident 'ius 
necessarium'. See also Jules Basdevant, 'Règles generals du droit de la paix' 58 (1936) 
Recueil des Cours Vol. IV  471, 642. C.f. Hans Wehberg, 'Pacta sunt servanda', 53 
(1959) American Journal of International Law 775, 782 and providing an overview 
Kirsten Schmalenbach, 'Article 26' in Oliver Dörr/Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), 
Vienna convention on the law of treaties – A commentary (Springer 2012) para. 13-22 with 
further references. 
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compromise), these notions are used as synonyms here. This includes the 
assumption that individuals have a reciprocal interest in forming legal rules 
to coordinate cohabitation and to act cooperatively.110 The compromise is 
thus based on the general assumption of creating positive effects for all 
participating individuals. This assumption seems to be justified precisely 
because, without it, a binding consensus would be senseless. Contrary to 
social contract theories, these assumptions are not made in order to establish 
principles of justice111 or to legitimize specific forms of a societal 
organization.112 Without proposing a material content of just law, structural 
arguments regarding the connection of individuals through consensus—in 
other words, law—shall dominate the articulated understanding of law. 
A situation where all individual interests are not represented equally can no 
longer be considered a consensus according to this definition. This would be 
the case, for instance, in situations in which individuals are discriminated or 
a minority lacks acceptance. The disadvantaged individual or minority has 
the de facto possibility of revolting against this imposed consensus. This is 
reflected in the pre-legal principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, which is 
analogous to the pacta sunt servanda principle, held to be pre-legally valid. If 
these principles are also reflected in positive law, they become a declaratory 
regulation, which renews but does not establish their validity. However, it 
                                                 
110 For an interesting analysis arguing that rules are a cognitive phenomenon based on 
an inborn (moral) competence similarly to the language faculty brought up by 
Chomsky, see Matthias Mahlmann, Rationalismus in der praktischen Theorie – 
Normentheorie und praktische Kompetenz (2nd ed Nomos 2009). See also an overview of 
the current debate in evolutionary psychology given by Michael Tomasello and 
Amrisha Vaish, 'Origins of Human Cooperation and Morality' (2013) Annual Review 
of Psychology 231 ff. Lando Kirchmair, 'Morality Between Nativism and 
Behaviorism: (Innate) Intersubjectivity as a Response to John Mikhail's John 
Mikhail's 'Universal Moral Grammar' 37(4) (2017) Journal of Theoretical and 
Philosophical Psychology 230-260. 
111 John Rawls, Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit (1975 German translation by H. Vetter, A 
theory of justice, 1971); id., Das Recht der Völker (2002 German translation by W. 
Hinsch, The law of peoples, 1999). 
112 Koller (n 99) 17, who indicates that social contract theories have—on the one hand—
to determine an acceptable starting point allowing for a fair agreement. On the other 
hand, these social contract theories aim to show which principles find reasonable 
acceptance by all participants. 
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reinforces the importance of these principles and therefore strengthens the 
pre-legal assumptions made. In this regard, the choice for consensus seems to 
be justified to a certain extent by the fact that consensus has been positivized 
as an important source of law in international law.113 Moreover, EU law is 
actually the prime example of a legal order which is based on a real (founding) 
consensus: the treaties. 
Another parallel to social contract theories is the assumed equality between 
all individuals. This assumption was based on Thomas Hobbes's argument of 
empirically equal human beings114 and John Locke's presupposed equality 
among individuals as a natural right.115 Jean Jacques Rousseau also 
acknowledged equality of people as a fundamental precondition for his 
version of the social contract,116 as did John Rawls in his famous 'veil of 
ignorance'.117 Being aware of the importance of equality amongst individuals, 
this article will assume that equality.  
In order to analyze the relationship between international, EU and national 
law, it is necessary to outline the underlying concept of law. Following the 
aforementioned conditions, law is simply defined as a binding consensus 
(Willensübereinkunft) of all participating individuals. The consensus element 
may be fulfilled by different actions, such as explicit, implied or tacit 
acceptance.118 However, only consensus between two or more individuals 
                                                 
113 Art. 26 and 35 VCLT. 
114 Compare Hobbes (n 100) 102 on the empirical equality of humans in the state of 
nature. See for criticism Koller (n 99) 18 f. 
115 Locke (n 101) 203. 
116 Rousseau (n 102) 1. book, 6. chapter, 17 f, who argues even for expropriation in order 
to achieve equality. 
117 Rawls (n 111) 36. However, see also criticism of the idea of equality by Robert Nozick, 
Anarchie, Staat, Utopie (1974 Anarchy, State, and Utopia, German translation by H. 
Vetter 1976) 214 ff. James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit, Zwischen Anarchie 
und Leviathan (1975 The Limits of Liberty, Between Anarchy and Leviathan, 1984) 1 
ff, who also designed his social contract theory without individual equality. Koller (n 
99) 19, 188. Nevertheless, see Buchanan (n 117) 2 on the necessity for methodological 
individualists to recognize fellow human beings. 
118 Compare for such an understanding of consensus also Rüdiger Wolfrum and Jakob 
Pichon, 'Consensus' in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL online edition (2010) para 3. 
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may produce an objective, i.e. common legal rule.119 The consensus produces 
objectivity because it unifies the individual interests of the participants. The 
resulting overlapping interest, for example, a common rule to organize 
cohabitation, becomes objective through the binding consensus. Consensus 
is furthermore understood in an abstract way, with collective will being the 
central idea. How this common will is ascertained, however, shall not be 
analyzed. On the contrary, it will be assumed as a starting point. The 
conviction of the individuals concerned with whether they can establish a 
positive compromise is assumed to be a sufficiently stabilizing element for 
this legal concept and its binding character.120 The pre-legal, reasonable pacta 
sunt servanda principle reflects this. 
2. The Theory (of the Law Creators' Circle) 
A. Definition 
The law creators' circle is defined as the circle of two or more individuals, 
which originates in the creation of one single binding consensus. In other 
words, the law creators' circle originates through the creation of law, which 
rests upon the consensus of individuals. If the very same individuals create 
another consensus, this is to be considered as a supplement to the same law 
creators' circle. As a consequence, individuals may only create a binding 
consensus for themselves.121 Accordingly, law creators are only the 
individuals, who are simultaneously the creators and the addressees of the 
consensus. 
In terms of their relationship to each other, the individuals who do not share 
a single law creators' circle remain in the legal desert. Figure 1 below, 
illustrates two law creators' circles which are constituted by wholly different 
                                                 
119 Weinberger (n 103) 73. 
120 The binding character is considered to be an implied element of the consensus. 
Eugenio Bulygin, 'Das Problem der Geltung bei Kelsen' in Stanley L. Paulson and 
Michael Stolleis (eds), Hans Kelsen – Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20. 
Jahrhunderts (Mohr Siebeck 2004) 80, 88f with further references at p. 95; Matthias 
Knauff, Der Regelungsverbund: Recht und Soft Law im Mehrebenensystem (Mohr Siebeck 
2010) 25, who speaks of a specific characteristic of law that legal validity rests on 
useful conventions. 
121 See the above-mentioned pre-legal pacta tertiis principle, II. 
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individuals — for example, individuals A, B and C on the one hand and D, E 
and F on the other hand. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Figure 1 
However, this does not imply any judgment of the legal desert. The legal 
desert is a neutral, pre-legal status. Furthermore, there is the need to stress 
once again: one single consensus on a specific matter suffices to constitute a 
law creators' circle between the participating individuals. 
B. Conflicts between Different Law Creators' Circles 
Individuals who do not share the same law creators' circle are, in relation to 
each other, in the legal desert (see Figure 2 below; the different colours 
illustrate that these two law creators' circles established rules with non-
identical content). However, this is just theoretically relevant because 
nowadays ius cogens rules — even though in a very fundamental and limited 
sense — provide practically for universal fundamental rules by the largest 
possible law creators' circle. Naturally, the status of a legal desert regarding a 
specific subject matter lasts only until individuals join a law creators' circle 
and consent upon this specific subject matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
D, E and F A, B and 
C 
D, E and F A, B and 
C 
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Different law creators' circles are less of a concern. Yet if they overlap, 
problems may arise. Law creators' circles overlap if an individual is, at the 
same time, a member of two different circles whose total members are not 
fully identical (see Figure 3 below). This would be the case, for instance, if the 
white circle includes individuals A, B, and C and the blue circle includes 
individuals C, D, and E. Recall that individuals participating in one law 
creators' circle are by definition creators and addressees of the consensus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Overlapping circles are unproblematic if they include completely diverging 
subject matters (see the different colours of the circles in Figure 3 above, 
which indicate that the white and the blue circles relate to different subject 
matters). However, if one or more individuals are at the same time members 
of different but partly overlapping law creators' circles regulating the same 
subject matter, they are possibly conflicting (see Figure 4 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
A and B C D, E and F 
A and 
B 
C D, E and F 
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A norm conflict arises if the application of any right or duty in one circle is 
contradictory to any right or duty in the other circle of which the same 
individual is also a member (see Figure 4 above).122 Once a consensus has been 
established by a law creators' circle, it must not be infringed upon by a single 
individual, either by simply breaching the consensus without the acceptance 
of the other members of this law creators' circle, or by stating a conflicting 
consensus with other individuals (pacta sunt servanda as well as pacta tertii).123 
In other words, if A, B, and C agree that x is a forbidden action, B, C, and D 
must not allow x either. However, regarding the solution of this conflict of 
norms, we remain in the legal desert. As far as different law creators' circles 
are concerned, the well-known norm conflict solution rules like the maxim 
lex posterior and lex specialis do not provide a solution. It is important to 
emphasize that these norm conflict solution rules may only provide for a 
solution within one and the same law creators' circle. This, however, does not 
                                                 
122 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen (Manz 1979) 99; Similarly Kelsen (n 31) 
209. See also Ewald Wiederin, ‚Was ist und welche Konsequenzen hat ein 
Normkonflikt' 22 (1990) Rechtstheorie 311, 318, who specifies this by stating that also 
conflicts between commanding and permitting norms are norm conflicts at 324. This 
also applies in cases of de facto inability (316). See also Erich Vranes, 'The Definition 
of ‚Norm Conflict' in International Law and Legal Theory', 17 (2006) European 
Journal of International Law 395, 418 who also argues in favor of a broad definition 
of norm conflicts. See also Kirsten Schmalenbach, 'Article 53' in Oliver Dörr/Kirsten 
Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna convention on the law of treaties – A commentary (Springer 
2012) para 54. Cf. Karl Engisch, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung (Winter 1935), p. 46; and 
id., Einführung in das juristische denken (7th ed. Kohlhammer 1977) 162. Cf. Thomas 
Zoglauer, Normenkonflikte – zur Logik und Rationalität ethischen Argumentierens 
(Frommann-Holzboog 1998) 125 ff. For a more narrow definition, which is often used 
on the international level, see Wilfred Jenks, 'The conflict of law-making treaties', 
30 (1953) British Yearbook of International Law 401, 426: 'A conflict in the strict sense 
of direct incompatibility arises only where a party to the two treaties cannot 
simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties.' And also Gabrielle 
Marceau, 'Conflicts of norms and conflicts of jurisdictions: The relationship 
between the WTO agreement and MEAs and other treaties', 35 (2001) Journal of 
World Trade 1081, 1084. 
123 Erich Vranes, 'Lex superior, lex specialis, lex posterior – Rechtsnatur der 
'Konfliktlösungsregeln', 65 (2005) Heidelberg Journal of International Law 391, 402, 
n. 48. 
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prevent a norm conflict solution circle from being created which embraces 
both conflicting circles (see Figure 5 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
But if there is no embracing conflict solving circle, those individuals remain 
in the norm conflict solving legal desert. Of course, this does not mean that 
conflicts might not be solved peacefully and satisfactorily. But there is no 
legal norm conflict solution rule. The theory of the law creators' circle does 
not provide any solution for the constellation of partly overlapping and 
conflicting law creators' circles either.  
C. The Theory of the Larger Law Creators' Circle 
The theory of the larger law creators' circle is based on the aforementioned 
pre-legal assumptions, which are the principles pacta sunt servanda and pacta 
tertiis. According to these pre-legal principles, the TLCC is fundamental for 
all agreed consensuses. If a legal rule has been created by a consensus, 
unilateral abrogation is no longer possible. The rule of the larger law creators' 
circle always prevails over the rule of the smaller circle, if — and this is 
important — all members of the smaller circle are also members of the larger 
circle — which means that the smaller circle is absorbed by the larger circle. 
(See figure 6 below, which illustrates that A, B, and C constitute the smaller 
D, E and F 
A and B C 
 
D, E and F 
A, B, and C 
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circle that is completely absorbed by the larger circle of A, B, C, D, and 
further individuals and so on and so forth). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
To illustrate this, I will discuss an example: if A, B, and C (the larger law 
creators' circle) ban smoking in their shared flat, then A and B alone (the 
smaller law creators' circle) may not re-instate smoking or smoke in their flat 
without C's acceptance. Consequently, the content of the agreed rule is 
decisive. The consensus of the larger law creators' circle must not be violated 
or hindered by a conflicting rule set up by the smaller law creators' circle. If 
the consensus were to be violated by one or more individuals, this would be a 
clear breach of the consensus of the larger circle and would thereby violate 
the pre-legal principle pacta sunt servanda.  
If the smaller circle does not break a rule of the larger circle, then the smaller 
circle is free to agree on whatever rules its members would like. For instance, 
it may agree upon further, more specific rules as long as they do not conflict 
with a rule of the larger circle. To illustrate this, I re-visit the 'smokers' 
example: in this scenario, A, B, and C ban smoking again, not only in their flat 
but also in the pub they frequent. At first glance, it seems less likely that A 
and B should not be allowed to smoke a cigarette in the pub if they wish to do 
so when going out one evening without C. To understand this, it is important 
to take a close look at the consensus agreed upon between A, B, and C. It is 
A, B and C 
A 
B 
C 
D 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
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essential to know whether they agreed to stop smoking in general or just 
when in each other's company. If the agreed consensus aims at preventing 
them from smoking in general — regardless of the place and whose company 
they are in — it is only possible for all three of them together to change or end 
their agreed consensus.  
The change of location from their flat to a public bar is intended to show that 
the content of the agreed consensus is crucial. It is much more likely that they 
would agree to a ban on smoking in their flat, even if for different reasons, 
than they would do so in general (also in the pub). Therefore, one might think 
that A and B are free to smoke in the bar if the consensus agreed upon by A, 
B, and C does not contain any specifications or any explicit command 
forbidding them to deviate from this. But if it does include a specification or 
an explicit command and it is clear that the consensus is a general ban on 
smoking, they may only override or change it by all three acting together. The 
command not to deviate from the agreed consensus might, furthermore, be 
implicitly found in the smoking ban in relation to the shared flat. Without 
any further specification of the consensus, we can only assume that the 
command not to deviate originated from the consensus itself. In the pub 
example, an explicit command stating that a deviation from the agreed ban is 
or is not allowed might be seen as necessary in order to clarify that A or B, 
alone or together, might deviate from the ban. Without this explicit 
command, one could assume that A and/or B are allowed to smoke when C is 
not present. However, if an explicit command not to smoke in the pub, 
whether alone or with others, has been agreed on by all three, it is clear that, 
according to the theory of the larger law creators' circle, any agreement by A 
and/or B (the smaller circle) to allow smoking in the pub would violate the 
consensus of A, B, and C (the larger circle). Consequently, it is paramount to 
know whether the smaller circle has simply established a more specific rule 
which does not conflict with the consensus of the larger circle, or whether the 
smaller circle rule directly violates the consensus of the larger circle.  
While a mere specification of a rule is not problematic, a norm conflict is. A 
norm conflict caused by the rule of the smaller circle conflicting a rule of the 
larger circle contravenes the theory of the TLCC and the pre-legal, 
reasonable principle of pacta sunt servanda which it is based on. If the larger 
law creators' circle gives a material command, the smaller law creators' circle 
84 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
must obey this command. If the larger circle agrees on a certain consensus, 
this same consensus may only be changed or deviated from on the same level 
as it was agreed on (the larger circle). This also applies to the legal 
consequences and effects of the consensus on the members of the smaller 
circle. 
According to the TLCC, if the members of the different law creators' circles 
are not identical or fully included in a larger circle, it is not possible for the 
smaller law creators' circle to be overruled by the larger circle. This larger 
circle is not related to the smaller circle because the members of the different 
circles are not identical (see Figure 7 below). Therefore, it does not matter if 
those circles include conflicting rules regarding their subject matters because 
both apply the pacta tertii principle. The circles are, in relation to each other, 
in the legal desert. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
If some, but not all, of the members of both circles with conflicting subject 
matters are identical, the case is different (see Figure 8 below). The 
constellation of Figure 8 is very close to the constellation of Figure 4. The 
question is whether the size difference between constellation 4 and 
constellation 8 is relevant. It is important to note that the constellation in 
Figure 8 is impossible with regards to the relationship between international 
and national law because the State (the smaller law creators' circle) 
participates in the making of law in the international sphere (the larger law 
creators' circle) as a unity, acting on behalf of its individuals. Yet, 
theoretically speaking, it is important to note that the case of Figure 8 is not 
the primary application of the theory of the larger law creators' circle. The 
difference from the constellation illustrated in Figure 4 is too insignificant. 
A, B and C 
D and E 
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Therefore, either a larger circle embracing both circles governs the conflict 
(see Figure 5 above) or the individuals concerned remain in the legal desert 
with regards to the solution of the norm conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
D. Legal Consequences Resulting from a Violation of the Consensus of the Law 
Creators' Circle 
In terms of the relationship between international, EU, and national law, the 
TLCC forces us to analyze the contents of the rulings of the larger, 
international (or EU with regards to national) law creators' circle. Contrary 
to prevailing theories on this relationship, there is no general, blanket legal 
consequence leading to an absolute or otherwise standardized legal 
consequence or effect of international law within the national legal order. 
Consequently, the TLCC does not stipulate a single absolute legal 
consequence. Generally speaking, the smaller law creators' circle lacks the 
ability to create a rule that conflicts with any rule of the larger circle 
(rechtliches Können). The larger circle is free to change this general situation. 
With regards to the relationship between EU and Member State law, the 
supremacy of EU law stipulates that Member States can make law conflicting 
with EU law (rechtliches Können). However, they are not allowed to make such 
law and in case they do anyhow, conflicting Member State law is not 
applicable (rechtliches Dürfen).124 In order to identify the effect of EU law 
                                                 
124 Case C-6/64 Costa v ENEL ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.  
A, B and C D E and F 
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within the Member State legal orders, the doctrine of direct effect is very well 
known.125  
Before coming to the peculiarities of the supranational EU legal order, a brief 
discussion of the relationship between international and EU or national law 
shall further illustrate what I have in mind. Using the relationship between 
international and EU or national law as an example, EU law or national law 
(the smaller law creators' circle) lacks the ability to create rules conflicting 
with ius cogens norms. EU or national rules conflicting with ius cogens are null 
and void ex tunc. The existence of ius cogens, however, suggests that the smaller 
law creators' circle (EU law or national law, both with regards to international 
law) has the ability to create EU or national rules that conflict with general 
international law without ius cogens character (rechtliches Können), but lacks the 
authorization to do so (rechtliches Dürfen). This implies that the focus should 
be on the emergence of international law. More recent EU or national law 
lacks the authorization to subsequently change — or even deviate from — 
international law by incorporating it into the EU or national legal order via 
reception theories. Therefore, it becomes crucial to analyze the content of 
the international rulings of the larger law creators' circle. The consensus of 
the larger, international circle is decisive when the legal consequences or 
effects of international law are analyzed in relation to national law. 
Having said this, it is important to note that most of the international rules 
do not stipulate a far-reaching effect on national law: (i.) Solely applicable 
(schlicht anwendbare) international rules must, therefore, be differentiated 
from (ii.) directly applicable (direkt anwendbare), and (iii.) individualizing 
(individualisierende) rules.  
(i) Solely Applicable Rules 
Solely applicable rules, also called inter-State laws, leave it up to the 
discretion of the national legal order to decide how to implement these rules 
domestically. Typical wording for such provisions is quite abstract, 
formulating only general obligations, which are then subject to further 
specification by national laws. Even today, most of the international rules are 
                                                 
125 Andreas Th. Müller, Effet direct. Die unmittelbare Wirkung des Unionsrechts (Mohr 
Siebeck forthcoming). 
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still solely applicable, which means that they do not have a direct effect within 
the national legal order. Therefore, further specification of the international 
rule, for instance by national acts, is necessary. The EU or national act 
concretises and thereby 'implements' the general, i.e. solely applicable, 
international rule. The TLCC does not challenge this. The TLCC is not an 
ideological project aiming at advancing international law to have more effect 
within national law. With regards to the relationship between EU and 
Member State law this category, very roughly speaking, fits directives in EU 
law (Article 288 TFEU).126 
(ii) Directly Applicable Rules 
In contrast, directly applicable rules — in other words, self-executing rules — 
give no discretion to the national legal order in deciding how to implement 
these rules domestically. Directly applicable norms take effect within the EU 
or national legal order without any EU or national act except for ratification, 
and consequently simply do not leave discretion to the national legal order.127 
In this case no further national act is needed and EU or national law-applying 
organs — such as the courts — have to apply it directly .128 If an international 
                                                 
126 However, as is well known: badly implemented or too late implemented directives 
can, nevertheless, have direct effect. C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich v Italy 
EU:C:1991:428. Yet, a detailed analysis of the legal acts of EU law on Member States' 
legal orders when thinking with the TLCC must be postponed due to a lack of space.  
127 Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht – Theorie und Praxis (3rd 
ed Duncker & Humblot 1984) 550; Stefan Griller, Die Übertragung von Hoheitsrechten 
auf zwischenstaatliche Einrichtungen (Springer 1989) 355, who defines direct 
applicability [even related to the EU] as national validity of individual international 
law norms with direct legal effect without any interference of an additional national 
act. Compare furthermore August Reinisch, 'Zur unmittelbaren Anwendbarkeit von 
EWR-Recht' (1993) Zeitschrift für Europarecht, Internationales Privatrecht und 
Rechtsvergleichung 11, 15, with further references in n. 40; and Yuji Iwasawa, 'The 
doctrine of self-executing treaties in the United States: A critical analysis' 26 (1986) 
Virginia Journal of International Law 627, 632, n. 27; compare also Thomas 
Buergenthal, 'Self-executing and non-self-executing treaties in national and 
international law' 235 (1992) Recueil des Cours Vol. IV 303, 317.  
128 Karen Kaiser, 'Treaties, direct applicability' in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL 
online edition (2011) para. 1; Karel Vasak, 'Was bedeutet die Aussage, ein Staatsvertrag 
sei 'self-executing'? – Zum Erkenntnis des Verfassungsgerichtshofs vom 27.6. 1960, 
B 469/59' 24 (1961) Juristische Blätter 352, 352. 
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treaty or a provision of it is directly applicable, the smaller (EU or national) 
circle has already accepted this effect by agreeing to the consensus at the 
international level. A subsequent unilateral EU or national derogation of the 
deliberately consented direct applicability of the international treaty is 
opposed according to the TLCC. Again, very cautiously, this category relates 
best to EU regulations (Article 288 TFEU).  
(iii) Individualizing Rules 
A third category of international rules, which can be distinguished from 
solely and directly applicable rules, is individualizing rules. Individualizing 
rules are those international rules that directly address individuals, without 
the need for an EU or national organ to enforce or apply them. They bind or 
grant rights to individuals directly without the EU or a State intervening 
(again, except for the making of this international norm).129 Individualizing 
international rules are rules which are not directed towards the EU or the 
State, but directly towards the individual without using the EU or the State 
as a mediator. Several international criminal law norms or—with regards to 
national law only—also Article 34 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights as well as similar provisions constitute examples for individualizing 
rules. In this case again, there is no need for any incorporation, adoption or 
transformation of the international rule into the EU or national legal order. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU as well as the possibility of 
individuals to launch actions for annulment (Article 263 (4) TFEU) come to 
mind when speaking about individualizing rules of EU law. 
E. The Connection between Law Creators' Circles130 
Based on the analysis in the previous sections, the larger the law creators' 
circle, the thinner the regulation density becomes. The consensus also tends 
to be more abstract and fundamental the larger a circle becomes. However, 
this is not a theoretical restriction on the regulatory possibility of the larger 
                                                 
129 Compare the enumeration made by Jost Delbrück, ‚Das Individuum im Völkerrecht' 
in Georg Dahm et al. (eds), Völkerrecht Vol. I/2 (2nd ed De Gruyter 2002) 259, 263f 
with further references. Griller (n 4) 96, 98 ff; Anne Peters, Jenseits der Menschenrechte: 
Die Rechtsstellung des Individuums im Völkerrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2014). 
130 Of Those Circles of Which the Larger Circle Includes All Members of the Smaller 
Circle, See Figure 6. 
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or even largest possible law creators' circle. Rather, this is a practical 
phenomenon. The more individuals that are involved, the more difficult it 
becomes to reach a consensus. But, theoretically, if all legal rules stemmed 
from the same largest conceivable law creators' circle embracing all 
individuals, no smaller law creators' circles would exist. Practically, this is not 
(yet) the case. Therefore, many subject matters are not embraced by an 
international, or even a very large EU, law creators' circle. Hence, only the 
most fundamental rules are embraced by the largest possible law creators' 
circle. All but these rules are left to smaller law creators' circles at the next 
smaller level. This continues until the smallest possible level of two 
individuals. The TLCC's only condition is that the rules of the smaller law 
creators' circle must not conflict with a rule of the larger law creators' circle. 
In reading this, one might be tempted to compare the thoughts articulated 
here with the Kelsenian 'chain of validity'131 (in German, 
Delegationszusammenhang, on which the hierarchy of norms, Stufenbau nach der 
rechtlichen Bedingtheit, is based).132 The main characteristic of this chain of 
validity is that a norm can derive its validity only from another norm.133 As a 
consequence of this conviction, monism with primacy of international law 
stipulates that all national law derives validity from the higher international 
law.134 Similarly the 'competence-theory' of Verdross holds that State-
sovereignty is a competence derived from international law and thereby the 
existence of an international constitution is assumed.135 Besides other crucial 
                                                 
131 Raz (n 35) 105; Starke (n 23) 75. 
132 Kelsen (n 31) 196 ff, 221-222.  
133 Ibid; For a critical account of the Stufenbaulehre see, for example, Jakab (n 40). 
134 Kelsen (n 122) 221;  Verdross (n 8) 35. Compare for criticism thereof (using the legal 
order of the EU as an example) Lando Kirchmair, 'Die autonome Rechtsordnung der 
EU und die Grenzen von Monismus und Dualismus' in Matthias C. Kettemann (ed), 
Grenzen im Völkerrecht – Grenzen des Völkerrechts (Jan Sramek 2013) 275. 
135 Alfred Verdross, Die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes auf Grundlage der 
Völkerrechtsverfassung (Mohr Siebeck 1923) 31-35. This assumption of the 
'Kompetenz-Kompetenz,' located at the international sphere becomes even more 
clear by the statement of Alfred Verdross, 'Le fondement du droit international' 16 
(1927) Recueil des Cours Vol. I 247, 319. Compare generally concerning the 
'competence-theory' of Verdross Anke Brodherr, Alfred Verdross' Theorie des 
gemäßigten Monismus (Herbert Utz 2004) 75 ff. 
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differences between the 'chain of validity' and the TLCC, it is especially 
important to emphasize that the connection between the larger and the 
smaller law creators' circle according to the TLCC requires only that the 
smaller circle must not infringe any rule of the larger circle. If a specific 
subject matter is not regulated by a consensus at the level of the larger law 
creators' circle, the smaller circle is free to agree upon any consensus as its 
members wish. Consequently, the smaller law creators' circle is not derived 
from the larger circle and the validity of the rule of the smaller circle does not 
stem — at least not theoretically — from the larger circle. 
In a graphical nutshell: 
Table 3: The Theory of the Law Creators' Circle:  
  TLCC 
Presuppositions - Pre-legal pacta sunt servanda. 
- Common understanding of the law (however, only in 
case we want norm conflict solution). 
Theoretical 
Outcome 
- Common denominator for norm conflict solution. 
- Authorization for norm creation of the smaller circle 
in the larger circle. 
Legal 
Consequences 
- Larger circle's consensus trumps (identical) smaller 
circle's consensus. 
- Smaller circle must not unilaterally derogate from the 
consensus of the larger circle. 
- Content is decisive (in terms of analysing whether 
the smaller circle is bound by a consensus of the larger 
circle). 
Failure ? 
3. Practical Application of the TLCC 
Now that the theory has been spelled out, the final Section aims at testing its 
applicability with the example of the European Union and its relationship to 
its Member States (III.3.a.) as well as towards other (international) legal 
orders (III.3.b.). 
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Here, I apply the TLCC to the relationship between EU law and Member 
State law as well as EU law and international law. I am convinced that a 
theory-based argument analyzing the relationship between international, EU 
and Member State law will fruitfully contribute to key issues in EU law such 
as the doctrine of direct applicability or the primacy question between EU 
law and the fundamental constitutional law of its Member States as well as to 
the relationship between EU and international law. It could provide 
convincing theoretical argumentation, solving potential tensions between 
the constitutional courts of some Member States and the CJEU as well as 
other international courts and tribunals. For example, arguments embedded 
in a sound theoretical explanation may help to clarify such questions as the 
tension between European integration and the (German) 'constitutional 
identity' which, according to the German Constitutional Court, is resistant 
to integration.136 Moreover, the famous 'Kadi saga'137 could be seen in a 
slightly different light as well. 
A. EU Law and Member State Law 
According to the TLCC, the EU is the larger law creators' circle with regards 
to its Member States. All EU Member States in turn are independent smaller 
law creators' circles which are also part of the EU circle. This is illustrated by 
Figure 6 above. The consensus established at the level of the larger EU law 
creators' circle must not be violated unilaterally by a smaller Member State 
law creators' circle. However, it only concerns the content that has been 
consented to. For any further consensus, the smaller law creators' circles 
remain free to consent on what they wish. This stands in contrast to a monist 
understanding of the relationship between EU and Member State law. The 
TLCC does not hold that Member State law is delegated from EU law. Nor 
does the TLCC assume that in order to conceive EU law and Member State 
law both as law, it is logically necessary to conceive them as a unitary legal 
                                                 
136 Mattias Kumm, 'Rebel Without a Good Cause: Karlsruhe's Misguided Attempt to 
Draw the CJEU into a Game of 'Chicken' and What the CJEU Might do About It' 
(2014) 15(2) German Law Journal 203-215. 
137 C-402  &  C-415/05P  Kadi v  Commission EU:C:2008:461;  C-584,  C-593,  &  C-595/10P  
Commission  v  Kadi EU:C:2013:518. C.f. Matej Avbelj, Filippo Fontanelli and 
Giuseppe Martinico (eds), Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Trial 
(Routledge 2014). 
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order.138 The TLCC only states that once a consensus has been reached at the 
level of a larger law creators' circle (which in our case here is EU law), then it 
must not be derogated unilaterally by a smaller law creators' circle. If the aim 
is to solve norm conflicts as defined above, then and only then is a common 
denominator, i.e. a common definition of law, necessary. In contrast to 
dualism or pluralism the TLCC provides an argument for where to look for 
such common ground. It is the consensus at the level of the larger circle. 
Reaching a consensus at the level of the larger circle might be eased by formal 
procedures such as majority ruling or the authorization of certain specific 
organs to create law and so on and so forth. This has often happened in the 
EU by now as it has developed into a supranational organization with 
constitution-like character traits.139 Law making in the EU shows roughly all 
the basic rule-of-law criteria. However, it is important to emphasize that the 
TLCC is not about triggering yet an(other) argument as to whether the EU is 
truly a constitutional community or what is missing in order for it to become 
one. The TLCC is simply a structural argument which indicates where to 
look to answer questions such as who has the final say about certain subject 
matters. Hence, it is of utmost importance to understand clearly what the EU 
treaties and further legal life within the EU actually involve. 
The EU competence regime is decisive in this regard. It is vital to pinpoint 
exactly which competences have been shifted to the European level. To 
answer this question, it is important to define where the competence regime 
is regulated and who decides in case of a dispute about specific competences. 
The competences in Articles 2-6 TFEU are the starting point and in the case 
of conflict, the CJEU has the final say on matters of competences (Article 19 
TEU). Member States are referred to an action for annulment before the 
CJEU in case they think the EU lacks competence because they themselves 
are not authorized to void EU acts.140 Roughly speaking, if the EU has 
competence for a specific subject matter, the EU law creators' circle may 
                                                 
138 Gragl (n 32) 674, 685; Gragl (30). 
139 Case 294/83 Parti ecologiste 'Les Verts' v European Parliament EU:C:1986:166, para 23 
'the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty'. See also recently Case C-284/16 Slovak 
Republic v Achmea BV ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, para 33: 'the constitutional structure of 
the EU'. 
140 Case C-314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost ECLI:EU:C: 1987:452. 
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adopt legal acts. EU legal acts within the framework of EU competences are 
legally binding and in the case of conflict with MS law they enjoy 
supremacy.141 This is largely uncontested. 
The question is whether this supremacy has limits, i.e. whether there is a core 
of a national 'constitutional identity' which is resistant to this supremacy. 
Similarly, as the TLCC does not say anything about the question as to which 
political system or which specific norm might be just, neither does it say 
whether there should or should not be something like a core resistant to 
integration. The TLCC is neutral towards the content. It does, however, say 
that once a consensus has been taken at the level of a larger law creators' 
circle, this consensus must not be violated unilaterally by a smaller circle. 
Therefore, it is crucial to analyze the norms of the smaller circle which 
authorize consensus formation in the larger circle. These were national 
norms on the authorization to conclude and ratify international treaties at the 
very beginning of the EU.142 By now, the EU autonomously regulates how its 
own legal edifice changes (Article 48 TEU on ordinary and simplified revision 
procedures). Major changes like the introduction of completely new treaties, 
for instance, are subject to ratification by all Member States.143 In effect, this 
means that they have to be ratified unanimously by the larger EU law creators' 
circle (in the sense of the abolishment of the old consensus at this level). A 
unilateral derogation by only a few Member States would clearly violate the 
consensus of the larger law creators' circle (which, of course, is not to say that 
this is not possible). An 'integration resistant core', on the one hand, must not 
violate any consensus which has been obtained at the level of the larger EU 
law creators' circle. On the other hand, the larger law creators' circle must not 
autonomously add competences without authorization by all of the smaller 
                                                 
141 See Case C-6/64 Costa v ENEL ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; as well as Case C-10/97 
IN.CO.GE.'90 and others EU:C:1998:498; Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten GmbH 
EU:C:2010:503, para 55. 
142 For the designation authorization (instead of incorporation, implementation or the 
like) compare Kirchmair (n 10). 
143 Dieter Grimm, 'The role of national constitutions in a united Europe' in Dieter 
Grimm, Constitutionalism. Past, present, and future (Oxford University Press 2015) 274, 
who holds 'that within the purview of European law the latter [national law] can no 
longer act in a self-determined manner'. Nevertheless, 'the EU has not yet acquired 
the right to determine its own legal basis'. 
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law creators' circles. This also holds true for the interpretation of the scope 
of application of EU law, which essentially must be reflected in the consensus 
of the larger law creators' circle. This refers to the question on the scope of 
applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,144 the rule of law crisis in 
the EU and judicial independence,145 as much as to the scope of autonomy of 
the EU legal order.146 
The TLCC also puts emphasis on the question as to how to interpret the 
content of a consensus. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) offers rules for the interpretation for international treaties. Again, 
by now, the CJEU, based on Article 19 TEU, has developed its own array of 
interpretation techniques (as there is no provision clearly stipulating which 
                                                 
144 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2013:105; Case C-206/13 Siragusa 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:126 regarding the scope of applicability of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the general recurring debate about judicial activism. See, 
for instance, Allan Rosas, When is the Charter of Fundamental Rights applicable at 
national level? (2012) 19(4) Jurisprudence 1269-1288, 1270 holding that the 
'introduction of a fundamental rights regime into EU law is essentially a story of 
judge-made law'. 
145 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:117 holding basically that the CJEU is competent—relying on the 
principle of effective judicial protection enshrined in second subparagraph of Article 
19 (1) TEU—to evaluate the guarantee of independence of national courts and 
tribunals if this 'may concern the application or interpretation of EU law' (para 39). 
This is too prime example of the fine line of how to understand the competence 
regime of the EU as the appointment and removal of judges actually is an exclusive 
MS competence. 
146 See only recently Case C-284/16 Slovak Republic v Achmea BV ECLI:EU:C:2018:158 
and the confirmation that investment arbitration in an intra EU context is part of 
EU law (and, thus, within the competence of the EU and the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU). Therefore, investment tribunals in such a context lack jurisdiction as Art. 
267 and 344 TFEU preclude provisions establishing arbitral tribunals (para 62) as 
they could 'interpret or indeed apply EU law' (para 42) and thereby endanger unity, 
primacy and effectiveness of EU law. While also this decision has caused an upheaval 
in academia and the 'arbitration world', the TLCC suggests actually simply to look 
at the competence of the larger law creators' circle, the EU legal order and whether 
there we find sufficient support for the approach taken—in the case at hand—by the 
CJEU. If one does so, it seems indeed, that EU law covers the approach taken. 
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interpretation technique shall be used or be supreme in case of conflict147).148 
The interpretation techniques employed by the CJEU largely correspond to 
'classical techniques' well known in national law or those mentioned in the 
VCLT.149 I will not go into details here. For now, this indication shall suffice. 
B. International Law and EU Law 
The TLCC is based upon natural persons who reach a consensus. If A, B, and 
C agree upon a consensus, this must not be violated subsequently by B and C 
without A. What has just been said about the relationship between EU and 
Member State law also applies to the relationship between international and 
EU law. Once the law creators' circle of the EU has agreed upon a consensus 
with a larger, international law creators' circle, it must not violate it 
unilaterally. It is thus decisive to, first, clearly identify how the EU law 
creators' circle can establish a consensus at the larger international level 
(Article 216-219 TEU). Second, it is important to determine the content of 
the consensus. This interpretation process is primarily the task of the level at 
which the consensus has been agreed. This is the international level. For 
instance, in Achmea BV, the CJEU confirmed that in principle EU law allows 
for an international agreement establishing a court which interprets the 
provisions of such an agreement with a binding nature for the CJEU.150 This 
is accurate also when thinking with TLCC. Yet, the CJEU added the 
conditionality that this holds true 'provided that the autonomy of the EU and 
its legal order is respected'.151 I would add — again thinking with the TLCC — 
that this condition must be respected from those organs authorized by the 
EU legal order when concluding international agreements (and international 
law more generally). This conditionality, however, might not serve as an 
excuse for breaches of the concluded international agreements for instance 
                                                 
147 Giulio Itzcovich, 'The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of 
Justice' 10(5) (2009) German Law Journal 539. 
148 Koen Lenaerts and José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, To say what the law of the EU is: 
Methods of interpretation and the European Court of Justice, EUI Working Paper 
AEL 2013/9, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/28339/ 
AEL_2013_09_DL.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.  
149 Ibid. 
150 Case C-284/16 Slovak Republic v Achmea BV ECLI:EU:C:2018:158 para 57. 
151 Ibid. 
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in form of unilateral subsequent derogations, because international law as 
such also does not allow for invoking provisions of internal law as justification 
for a failure to perform a treaty (Art. 27 VCLT). Third, depending on the 
consensus, the effect of this consensus on the level of the smaller law creators' 
circle depends on whether the norm of the international law creators' circle 
is solely applicable, directly applicable or individualizing.152 
The international law creators' circle knows four different types of legal 
sources. These are, according to Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), (a) international conventions, (b) international 
custom, and (c) general principles of law. In addition, by now also (d) legal acts 
of international organizations can be a source of international law.153 
Depending on each source, different rules about their making, 
interpretation, and their legal effect are applicable. In order to determine 
their effect within the level of the smaller, in our case, the EU law creators' 
circle, it is necessary to look closely at the process of making and interpreting 
them. Unfortunately, there is not enough space to do so here. What I would 
like to emphasize is that the TLCC is not about the content but about the 
structural relationship between law creators' circles. If there is a consensus at 
the larger law creators' circle, the smaller circle must not unilaterally violate 
this consensus. 
For instance, in the famous Kadi saga, the CJEU annulled an EU regulation 
because this regulation implemented United Nations Security Council 
resolutions sanctioning suspected terrorists without respecting EU 
fundamental rights.154 The individual Yassin Abdullah Kadi was associated 
with Usama bin Laden or the Al-Qaeda network and therefore was enlisted 
by the UN Sanctions Committee, which was installed in the aftermath of 
                                                 
152 III.2.d.i)-iii). 
153 Jörg Polakiewicz, 'International law and domestic (municipal) law, law and decisions 
of international organizations and courts' in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL online 
edition (2012), para 1. 
154 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi v Council and Commission 
EU:C:2008:461 (Kadi I); and  C-595/10 P Commission and others v Kadi EU:C:2013:518 
(Kadi II). For an overview, Clemens Feinäugle, 'Kadi Case' (2014) Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law; Peter Hilpold, 'EU Law and UN Law in 
Conflict: The Kadi Case' (2009) 13 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 
141-182. 
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terrorist attacks on the embassy of the USA in Kenia and Tanzania in 1998. 
A consequence of this listing was the freezing of Mr. Kadi's and other 
individuals' or entities' European assets, which was implemented by an EU 
Regulation in 2002.155 Kadi challenged this listing in front of EU courts due 
to alleged violations to use his property freely, the breach of the right to 
effective judicial review as well as the right to a fair trial according to Art. 6 
ECHR. The Court of Frist Instance, however, decided in 2005 that the Court 
has no authority to call in question the lawfulness of UN Security Council 
Resolutions.156 While this judgment was associated with a monist 
understanding of the relationship between EU and international law, the 
CJEU did not follow this direction. On 3 September 2008 the Court annulled 
the regulation concerning Mr. Kadi finding that the CJEU has jurisdiction to 
review the lawfulness of the contested regulation as it has to ensure full review 
of the lawfulness of all EU acts 'in the light of the fundamental rights forming 
an integral part of the general principles of Community law'.157 By so doing 
the CJEU found a breach of 'the rights of defence, especially the right to be 
heard, and of the principle of effective judicial protection.'158 Moreover, the 
Court found also that Mr. Kadi's fundamental right to respect for property 
had been violated.159 Following this decision the UN Sanctions Committee 
provided Mr. Kadi with reasons for his listing and gave him the possibility to 
comment. Thereafter the Sanctions Committee decided to list Mr. Kadi 
again, which has again, implemented by Committee Regulation.160 Mr. Kadi 
also brought a case against this regulation before the General Court.161 Now 
the General Court followed the reasoning of the CJEU, conducted a full 
review of the challenged regulation and annulled it on 30 September 2010. 
The reasons given were that the information and evidence regarding the 
                                                 
155 Council Regulation 881/2002 of 27 May 2002. 
156 Case T-315/01, Kadi v Council and Commission, 21 September 2005, 
ECLI:EU:T:2005:332, 225. 
157 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi v Council and Commission 
EU:C:2008:461 (Kadi I) 326. 
158 Ibid 353 
159 Ibid 371. 
160 Commission Regulation (EC) 1190/2008 28 November 2008 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 881/2002. 
161 Case T-85/09 Kadi v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2010:418. 
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reasons for Kadi's listing had not been disclosed to him and so his right to 
defence and effective judicial review and to property were still violated. Even 
though the Sanctions Committee delisted Mr. Kadi on 5 October 2010, the 
European Committee, the Council of the European Union and the UK 
appealed. Finally, the CJEU hold on 18 July 2013 that the improvement of the 
UN Sanctions Committee procedure was not enough to change his holding 
in Kadi I.162  
Very briefly, according to the TLCC, the smaller law creators' circle should 
have invoked either an ultra vires competence of the larger law creators' 
circle, stating that the UN Security Council (to put it delicately) overstated 
its competence. Alternatively, it should have considered the resolution faulty 
because UN human rights had been violated (which would have necessarily 
implied—admittedly difficult—arguments for the application of human 
rights, in this case, effective judicial protection, at UN level).163 This is really 
just a superficial indication of what the TLCC implies in contrast to the grand 
old theories. However, I hope that the direction in which an application of 
the TLCC goes has been made visible and understandable. 
IV. RESUMÉ 
In this paper, I have argued that the TLCC provides a theoretical foundation 
for finding a decisive source in a norm conflict situation. It is, however, 
important to emphasize that the TLCC does not offer an absolute and 
invariable solution which fits any norm conflict arising between overlapping 
                                                 
162 C-595/10 P Commission and others v Kadi EU:C:2013:518, 66. 
163 C.f. for such an argument (albeit without TLCC as a basis) Martin Scheinin, 'Is the 
ECJ Ruling in Kadi Incompatible with International Law?', (2009) 28 (1) Yearbook 
of European Law 637-653. Gráinne De Búrca, 'The ECJ and the International Legal 
Order: A Re-Evaluation' in Gráinne de Búrca / Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds), The Worlds 
of European Constitutionalism (2012) 140. Andrea Bianchi, 'Assessing the Effectiveness 
of the UN Security Council's Anti-terrorism Measures: The Quest for Legitimacy 
and Cohesion' 17 (207) European Journal of International Law 881–919. Juliane 
Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, 'The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and 
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international, EU, and national legal orders. This is a sharp contrast to grand 
old theories such as dualism and monism, which are considered unable to face 
major recent developments of international, EU, and national legal orders. 
While also the predominant stream of global legal pluralism is restricted 
when answering the question behind this article as it does not offer a 
satisfactory prescriptive account, global constitutionalism suffers from major 
shortcomings too. Global Constitutionalism presumes too many substantial 
values for the envisaged common normative denominator in order to be a 
helpful concept for the relationship between international, EU and national 
law. While global constitutionalism cannot carry the 'burden of universality', 
with constitutional pluralism we likely end in a 'constitutional stalemate'. 
The TLCC aims to re-conceptualize the current debates that are based on 
monism, dualism, pluralism, and constitutionalism. Thereby I also aim at 
avoiding the pitfalls of global legal pluralism and global constitutionalism 
concerning their appropriateness for norm conflict solution between 
international, EU, and national legal orders. The goal is to answer the 
question as to whether it is within the competence of national law to 
determine the effect and validity of international or EU law within the 
domestic (constitutional) legal order and the international within the EU 
legal order or not. 
In a nutshell, a law creators' circle is defined as a circle of two or more 
individuals, which originates in the creation of one single binding consensus. 
The TLCC is based on pre-legal assumptions, which are the principles pacta 
sunt servanda and pacta tertiis. According to these pre-legal principles, TLCC 
is fundamental for all agreed consensuses. If a legal rule has been created by a 
consensus, unilateral abrogation is no longer possible. The rule of the larger 
law creators' circle always prevails over the rule of the smaller circle (A and B), 
if—and this is important—all members of the smaller circle are also members 
of the larger circle. In other words, the smaller circle is absorbed by the larger 
circle. 
What I have outlined so far might be disappointing, given the grand question 
I dared to ask in the title of this article. However, I am convinced that this 
complex and enormously important question as to how we can know who has 
the final say – international, EU or national law? – cannot be answered in an 
easy and universally uniform way. The vast array of massively diverging 
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theories and doctrines on the table are proof of that. Yet, I believe that it is 
important at least to attempt a sort of reconciliation between them. The 
TLCC is exactly that, with the focus on a structural analysis. I hope I 
succeeded at least in awakening the reader's curiosity pending the 
completion of the next necessary step for the TLCC, i.e. providing concrete 
answers for the current relationship of International, EU or national law. 
This forthcoming work includes a detailed analysis of the TLCC and the 
validity and effect of sources of international law in the EU legal order. 
Moreover, I will aim at expanding the application of the TLCC on the EU 
competence regime in order to shed some light on questions of constitutional 
identity and final supremacy.
